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There are a number of strategies employed by companies to limit 
price competition, including patenting. This article investigates 
patent licensing restrictions as a strategy to erode price com-
petition, using mainly information gleaned from the 1960–1962 
Kefauver Committee hearings. The article deals with the pharma-
ceutical industry, which is one of the few sectors in which patents 
are essential to the development and introduction of innovations. 
The current study adds to a body of literature that has yielded 
mixed results with respect to the role of patents in this industry. 
The main contribution of this research is that restrictive licens-
ing clauses, specifically field-of-use restrictions, are found to be 
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283Ethical Pharmaceutical Industry
relevant in eroding price competition in the institutional market. 
However, in the retail ethical market, price competition was 
absent even when no field-of-use restrictions were included in 
licensing contracts, although product competition was relevant 
between patented drugs.
The pharmaceutical industry is often put forward as the best exam-
ple of the need for patents. Patents are extremely important in reaping 
the benefits of innovation in the pharmaceutical industry due to 
two factors: the high cost of discovering, developing, and gaining 
regulatory approval for a new medicine, and the very low imitation 
costs relative to the expenditures incurred by the innovator in drug 
discovery and development.1 Many laboratories can replicate drugs 
because it is relatively easy to imitate a product once it is available 
on the market and after researchers analyze its composition. Thus, 
the pharmaceutical sector depends heavily on the patent system to 
protect innovative designs from imitation.2 It is only through enforce-
able patent protection that drug companies can generate sufficient 
revenues to undertake the costly and risky research and development 
(R&D) that makes the introduction of new products possible. In a few 
sectors, patents are essential to the development and introduction of 
innovations, and the pharmaceutical sector is one such example.3
However, patents can also be employed as a strategy to harm the 
competitive process by adopting measures to restrict price competi-
tion; to extend the breadth and duration of their patent protection; or 
to delay, discourage, or block the market entry of competing products 
(e.g., patents thickets, secondary patents, and defensive patents).4 
 1. See, e.g., Mansfield, “Patents and Innovation”; Penin, “Patents Versus 
Ex Post Rewards”; Slinn, “Patents and the UK Pharmaceutical Industry.” Sarett 
has shown that the average development costs per new chemical entity were 
$1.2 million in 1962 and $11.5 million in 1973. Sarett, “FDA Regulations.” For 
the relationship between science and the industry in the period 1890–1930, see 
Liebenau, Medical Science.
 2. Temin, Taking Your Medicine; Levin et al., “Appropriating the Returns”; 
Grabowski and Vernon, “Substitution Laws”; Gambardella, Science and Innovation.
 3. Silberston argues that the only industry in which patents are essential is 
the pharmaceutical industry. Silberston, Economic Importance of Patents.
 4. Ellison and Ellison, “Strategic Entry Deterrence”; Boldrin and Levine, 
Against Intellectual Monopoly; Comanor, “Research and Competitive Product 
Differentiation”; Steele, “Monopoly and Competition.” For an illustrative exam-
ple of how chemical firms in Germany employed patents to block competition 
from others manufacturers, both at home and abroad, see Liebenau, “Patents and 
the Chemical Industry.” One common current practice is so-called evergreening, 
in which pharmaceutical patent owners use the law to retain rent from their 
patents by taking out new patents to extend their intellectual property rights. 
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According to Henry Steele in a seminal work, firms use patents not 
only as a way to protect their innovations but also as a strategy to 
increase their market share and to limit price competition.5 For 
instance, patent or patent application holders may take measures such 
as cross-licensing agreements, licensing, and litigation settlements to 
restrict competition.6 Specifically, to maximize the value of an inno-
vation, patentees usually include field-of-use restrictions in licensing 
and cross-licensing agreements. These field-of-use restrictions are 
provisions under which licensees are prohibited from selling drugs in 
bulk form; that is, the form in which drugs are manufactured prior to 
being packaged into finished dosage form. This means that licensees 
can only sell patented drugs in finished dosage form, packaged form, 
or specialty form; that is, pharmaceutical drug products in the form 
in which they are marketed for use such as pills, tablets, capsules, 
or syrup. In this way, licensees prevent competitors from converting 
the bulk drug into finished and packaged tablets—tableting, bottling, 
packaging, and labeling—and from selling them either generically or 
under their own brand names and at their own prices.
The inclusion of a field-of-use restriction was commonplace in 
the agreements signed by big pharmaceutical firms in the period 
discussed in this article.7 The patent holder usually decided not to 
license to small firms, so this type of restriction blocked small com-
petitors from accessing the active ingredient in bulk form and from 
selling the drugs at significantly lower prices than those of large firms. 
This is because, on the one hand, smaller firms had a cost advantage 
over large companies because they did not have to recoup extensive 
R&D costs and the costs of advertising, promotion, and marketing. 
On the other hand, these costs were entry barriers for smaller compa-
nies into the prescription retail market. If the patent licensing agree-
ment included a field-of-use restriction, small firms could only buy 
the drug exclusively in finished packaged form at a higher price. 
In selling drugs not in bulk form but under a brand name, big firms 
The phrase refers to threats made to competitors regarding a brand-name man-
ufacturer’s tactical use of pharmaceutical patents. Manufacturers of a particular 
drug use evergreening to restrict or prevent competition from manufacturers of 
generic drugs. See Faunce and Lexchin, “‘Linkage’ Pharmaceutical Evergreening 
in Canada and Australia.”
 5. Steele, “Patent Restrictions.”
 6. For the need to resolve intellectual property disputes, see Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, “Protecting Intellectual Property Rights”; Gallini, “Economics of 
Patents.” For the use of the litigation process as an opportunity to engage in strate-
gic behavior, see Meurer, “Settlement of Patent Litigation.”
 7. Big companies were those that were fully integrated and had extensive 
research facilities, growing medical departments, and significant marketing 
capability.
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had to spend much more money on costly promotional campaigns. This 
expense ultimately made the drugs more expensive, because the big 
firms had to recover their marketing investment from the consumer. 
The inclusion of field-of-use restrictions in patent licensing agree-
ments theoretically provided a solution that reduced competition 
because these restrictions constrained price competition from small 
companies.
This article focuses on the ethical pharmaceutical industry in the 
United States—particularly the tranquilizer sector—in the 1950s and 
early 1960s, when psychopharmacology in the treatment of mental 
illness really took off.8 In this period of exponential growth of the 
pharmaceutical industry, large manufacturers challenged each other 
vigorously in product competition in order to gain a significant mar-
ket share through their major investments in R&D and marketing. 
Moreover, there was rapid growth in the number of new medicines 
to treat mental illness, sustained efforts by pharmaceutical firms to 
develop markets for their products, and rising demand for drugs. 
Consumers were optimistic about the possibilities of pharmaceutical 
science, and this culture led to increasing demand among patients 
despite the high prices.9
Concerns over the consequences of excessively high consumer 
pricing arose in the 1930s when inflation and its consequences for 
consumers became increasingly important issues in U.S. politics. 
It was in this context that economic New Dealers promoted government 
price control as a way of preventing under-consumption. In particu-
lar, by the late 1950s,10 Congressional Democrats, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), consumer groups, and some physicians became 
preoccupied with the high costs of prescription drugs and the adver-
tising practices of prescription drug firms.
 8. The modern era of psychiatry and the so-called psychopharmacological 
revolution began with the discovery of the antipsychotic efficacy of chlorproma-
zine in 1955. López Muñoz et al., “History of the Discovery.”
 9. Tone, “Tranquilizers on Trial.” From 1955 to 1960, the prescriptions of 
benzodiazepines (Miltown, Librium, and Valium) grew from zero to fifty million 
and implied a third of all psychiatric prescriptions drugs. Herzberg, Happy Pills in 
America, Appendix B, 209.
 10. There was a postwar antimonopoly movement against oligopoly formation 
and in favor of the consumer. The Temporary National Economic Committee 
(TNEC), which held hearings between 1938 and 1941 on how to resolve the Great 
Depression, was conscious of the danger of big business. Among the most influen-
tial subcommittee staffers who aided Estes Kefauver in his investigations were Irene 
Till and John Wilson, who had been members of the FTC in the early 1950s and 
had worked together on the TNEC. In the mid-1950s, there were congressional and 
FTC investigations of the TNEC to study price fixing within the drug industry. 
See Bud, “Antibiotics, Big Business, and Consumers,” 333–337; Williamson, Federal 
Antitrust Policy, 81–83. For an extended discussion of the relationship between anti-
monopoly and postwar consumer politics, see Scroop, “Faded Passion.”
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In response to these concerns, the influential Democrat Senator 
Estes Kefauver started a Congressional investigation to study the price 
inflexibility of firms producing ethical drugs (or prescription drugs) 
in certain product categories that were characterized by their novelty 
and their importance to medicine.11 The high demand for drugs and 
the role of patents as a strategy to harm price competition came to 
public attention in late 1959 during Kefauver’s hearings on the phar-
maceutical industry. These hearings were an important development 
in the political history of prescription drugs and the first attempt to 
regulate their prices.12 In particular, the senator focused on the rela-
tionship between patent protection and high prescription drug prices 
in the U.S. pharmaceutical sector. On May 8, 1961, the Subcommittee 
on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Committee sub-
mitted its report on the ethical drugs industry13 (ethical drugs are dis-
cussed below). The report found that monopolistic drug pricing and 
abuses of patent privilege existed in the U.S. pharmaceutical indus-
try. Following the hearings, Kefauver introduced a bill proposing sev-
eral reforms, one of which was to restrict the use of pharmaceutical 
patents in order to increase competition and reduce the price of pre-
scription drugs. His greatest legislative achievement was the passage 
of the Kefauver–Harris Drug Act of 1962, one of the most significant 
consumer safety laws of the twentieth century. Consequently, these 
hearings were fundamental to modern consumer politics and to the 
history of U.S. medicine after World War II.
 11. The four groups studied in the Senate were antibiotics, antidiabetic drugs, 
tranquilizers, and corticosteroids. They represented 42 percent of all ethical drug 
sales in 1959. Prescription retail drugs were almost 70 percent of total drug sales at 
the end of the 1950s. Steele, “Patent Restrictions,” 202.
 12. Senator Kefauver, a Democrat from Tennessee, was the chairman of the 
Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly between 1957 and 1963; was 
against the Eisenhower administration for favoring big business; was the leading 
critic of monopoly in the postwar United States; and was concerned with the 
concentration of economic power, its effect on free enterprise and the political 
system, and the consequences of excessive prices for consumption. Scroop, “Faded 
Passion,” 2, 7, 13–14. Doctors, retail druggists, and chambers of commerce pres-
sured Kefauver to drop the drug investigation almost a year before the hearings 
started. During the hearings, representatives of the industry criticized the sub-
committee. See Harris, Real Voice, 40.
 13. The Durham–Humphrey Amendment of 1951 clarified the definition of 
prescription drugs and refills, changed the rules on how medicines could be mar-
keted, and increased the protections of public health. These included that nonpre-
scription drugs could be sold directly to consumers, the decision as to whether or 
not a drug that required a prescription legend rested with the manufacturer, and 
to know more about the regulation of prescription drugs before 1951. See Swann, 
“FDA and the Practice of Pharmacy.” Just before World War II, the majority of U.S. 
producers still focused on nonprescription drugs; it was mainly in the 1950s when 
firms moved into prescription drugs. Chandler, Shaping the Industrial Century.
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This article is related to a growing body of literature focusing 
on the use of patent licensing as an instrument to limit competition.14 
Specifically, our purpose is to study whether field-of-use restric-
tions in patent licensing contracts truly impeded price competition, 
as the Kefauver Committee concluded. The main source employed 
for this study was the original Senate Subcommittee Hearings on 
Antitrust and Monopoly during the period 1959–1961 (the Kefauver 
Committee).15 The article, in turn, links to other strands of the litera-
ture such as the joint importance of R&D and marketing in the phar-
maceutical industry.
We show how patent licensing restrictions, in fact, facilitated the 
erosion of price competition for prescription drugs only in the insti-
tutional market, in which lower prices were the major tool of compe-
tition. In this submarket, the presence of smaller firms as competitors 
stemmed from the fact that licensing contracts did not include field-
of-use restrictions, which forced leading pharmaceutical companies 
to enter into price competition in order to sell their patented drugs. 
However, because smaller firms would have had to buy the drug in 
finished dosage form if field-of-use restrictions were included, they 
then would also have had to pay a price similar to retail druggists. 
Therefore, they would be in no position to engage in sales to hospitals 
or to the government at lower prices. This strategy among leading 
firms—including field-of-use restrictions in patent licensing contracts 
to exclude small firms as competitors and thereby to preserve their 
market position—made no sense in the retail prescription submarket. 
There was no price competition in this submarket, and product dif-
ferentiation and advertising were the major competitive weapons for 
increasing company market share. Smaller firms were not considered 
threats because the high costs of marketing and promoting a drug made 
it impossible for small sellers of generic-name products to obtain any 
significant share of the retail prescription market, even though they 
 14. See Taylor and Silberston, Economic Impact; Gallini, “Deterrence by Market 
Sharing”; Contractor, Licensing in International Strategy; Katz and Shapiro, 
“How to License Intangible Property”; Rockett, “Choosing the Competition”; 
Arora, “Patents, Licensing, and Market Structure.”
 15. On the decisive role of the Senate Committee Hearings in the history of 
American medicine after World War II, see Tobbell, “‘Who’s Winning the Human 
Race?’”; McFadyen, Estes Kefauver and the Drug Industry; Harris, “Real Voice.” 
The hearings constitute a rich source of primary source material on all aspects of 
American history. They include investigative files, and some contain police and 
other confidential reports or information that are difficult to find. In particular, they 
are a useful contribution to the literature on the pharmaceutical industry because 
there was no great quantitative information on pharmaceutical firms for this period 
outside the material published in the hearings. Steele, “Patent Restrictions,” 202. 
For example, finding licensing contracts is highly difficult as there is no patent 
license database and patent licensing deals are almost always confidential.
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were able to sell drugs cheaper than brand-name drugs because they 
incurred lower costs (that is, no research and marketing costs).
Some previous drug industry studies have concluded that there 
was an absence of competition in the drug industry as a result of pat-
ent privilege.16 Other studies found significant rivalry based on fac-
tors other than price in the pharmaceutical industry.17 The evidence 
presented in this article indicates that before any conclusions can be 
drawn, it is crucial to define the concepts of competition and of the 
market—institutional or retail—in which firms sold their patented 
drugs. Thus, we demonstrate that there was indeed a lack of price 
competition in the retail market but not in the institutional market. 
In the first submarket, this was true even when smaller firms were 
present as competitors, although product competition was relevant 
among patented drugs. Finally, our research also provides empirical 




	 •	 	Patents	 are	 necessary	 as	 a	 means	 to	 stimulate	 investment	 in	
R&D.
	 •	 	In	the	pharmaceutical	sector,	investment	in	R&D—and	its	align-
ment with marketing—is a major form of competition.18
 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The second sec-
tion begins with the main characteristics of the retail prescription 
market. The third section contains a short description of the ethical 
tranquilizer sector in the United States in the 1950s. In the fourth sec-
tion, we show the likely harm to competition caused by field-of-use 
restrictions in patent licensing contracts. The main conclusions are 
set out in the final section.
Selling Drugs in the Prescription Tranquilizer Sector
The golden age of drug discovery, or the therapeutic revolution, 
began around 1935 with the introduction of vitamins, hormones, 
 16. Boldrin and Levine, Against Intellectual Monopoly; Kremer, “Patent 
Buyouts”; Stiglitz, “Give Prizes not Patents”; Wright, “Economics of Invention 
Incentives”; Lall, “International Pharmaceutical Industry”; Steele, “Monopoly and 
Competition”; Steele, “Patent Restrictions”; Arrow, “Economic Welfare”; Polanyi, 
“Patent Reform”; Lall, “Price Competition.”
 17. Comanor, “Research and Competitive Product Differentiation”; Grabowski 
and Vernon, “Substitution Laws.”
 18. Slinn highlights the complementarity between patenting and marketing. 
Slinn, “Patents and the UK Pharmaceutical Industry.”
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2016.43
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 92.185.99.100, on 08 Jun 2017 at 16:09:21, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
289Ethical Pharmaceutical Industry
sulfonamides, and antibiotics and their derivatives, and it came 
to an end in the 1970s.19 During this period, drug development 
was a highly profitable activity, firms invested heavily in R&D, and 
competition increased as new products with incremental advances 
were introduced.20 These years of the therapeutic revolution also 
witnessed American’s growing enthusiasm for prescription pills, the 
rise of national health services, the expansion of the market, increas-
ing government control over drug development, and concerns about 
rising health care costs.21 The exponential growth of the pharmaceu-
tical industry from this therapeutic revolution and the expansion of 
the market are reflected in the fact that, by 1960, around 70 percent of 
all sales came from products that had not existed before 1951.22
Following World War II, the pharmaceutical sector was character-
ized by intense product differentiation and product competition.23 
Different manufacturers could market the same chemical entity under 
a number of separate and distinct brand names or under its generic 
name. During the patent period, the original manufacturer could 
license other firms to sell the drug, some with their own brand name 
and others with the generic name.24 Thus, the same drug was often 
marketed under different names. This approach is known as product 
differentiation.
Product competition was also intense in the pharmaceutical 
sector. When one firm was awarded a patent, other firms attempted to 
modify the molecular structure of the relevant compound in order to 
discover drugs with limited incremental advances in therapeutic value. 
Such drugs might be similar to those products already on the market 
yet sufficiently different to win a patent.25 Pharmaceutical compa-
nies generally recognized that they were in a race with other firms to 
develop innovative drugs.26 It was the era of molecular modification, 
 19. Quirke, “Material Culture of British Pharmaceutical Laboratories”; 
Anderson, Making Medicines, 168.
 20. Henderson, Orsenigo, and Pisano, “Pharmaceutical Industry.”
 21. Quirke, “From Alkaloids to Gene Therapy”; Slinn, “Development of the 
Pharmaceutical Industry.” Price regulation began because it was thought that to 
do so would contribute to containing healthcare costs. Slinn, “Price Controls or 
Control Through Prices?”
 22. Munos, “Lessons from 60 years”; Greene, “Attention to ‘Details,’” 338.
 23. Comanor, “Research and Competitive Product Differentiation.”
 24. Greene, Generic, chapter 2.
 25. Comanor, “Political Economy”; Greene, Generic, 211–230.
 26. It was during the interwar years when the core pharmaceutical compa-
nies began to develop research networks, making research part of their competitive 
strategy. Tobbell, Pills, Power and Policy. The importance of first-mover advantage 
was very clear in this sector and one of the reasons for early patenting: being first to 
market with a new product brought high rewards. David, Foray, and Steinmueller, 
“Research Network.”
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meaning that not all drugs on the market were really innovative; 
rather, they were duplicate drugs under different names. Such prod-
ucts are called false innovations, me-too, or duplicative drugs, and are 
defined as drugs with chemical properties and therapeutic effects sim-
ilar to those of drugs already on the market.27 They were considered 
innovative due to their new characteristics; for example, better taste 
or better metabolism. The importance of molecular modification was 
reflected in the fact that the bulk of spending on research by pharma-
ceutical companies was “to exploit and market the foreign advances 
or to modify the original drugs just enough to get a patentable deriv-
ative, but not to change it enough to jeopardize the original effect.”28
The vast majority of “new” drugs were variations of older drugs 
already on the market, although they may have been important for 
some patients due to their therapeutic properties.29 However, the 
number of new chemical entities (that is, a drug or chemical without 
precedent among regulated and approved drug products because of 
its significant therapeutic advance) was comparatively small. More 
than 4,560 new ethical drugs were introduced in the period 1951–
1961, of which only 360 were truly innovative drugs; that is, new 
chemical entities.
The me-too business was possible because the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), which had been authorized starting in 1938 to 
approve prescription drugs; it usually approved a drug simply if it 
was better than a placebo, but it was obligated to certify only its safety, 
not its efficacy.30 Sometimes there was not even the slightest differ-
ence between different products; nevertheless, competing companies 
advertised them as different compounds. The FDA was required to 
 27. In the economic literature, these combinations of well-known molecules 
are called minor innovations or incremental innovations, and new chemical enti-
ties are called radical innovations. Kessel, “Beyond Innovation,” 16–17.
 28. Testimony by Frederick H. Meyers, associate professor of Pharmacology, 
University of California, “Administered Prices in the Drug Industry” (hereafter 
“Administered Prices”), 86th Cong., 1960, 2nd Session, part 18, at 10,394. Most 
molecular modifications yielded only me-too products. Silverman and Lee, Pills, 
Profits and Politics, 5.
 29. A former head of research at Squibb estimated that more than half of this 
company’s drug research was targeted at developing copycat drugs. “Administered 
Prices,” 86th Cong., 1960, 2nd Session, part 18, at 10,380.
 30. Prior to the 1962 drug amendments, Congress gave jurisdiction over drug 
advertising to the FTC. The FDA had limited authority and only regulated direct 
advertising to doctors. A more restrictive FDA policy for drug approval followed 
the 1962 drug amendments, when the FDA increased its demands for evidence 
of efficacy and safety. The new legislation gave the FDA jurisdiction to regulate 
prescription drug advertising and gave control over nonprescription drug adver-
tising to the FTC. Donohue, “History of Drug Advertising.” On the regulatory 
role of the FDA and its influence, see Carpenter, Reputation and Power; Tobbell, 
Allied Against Reform; Marks, “Making Risks Visible.”
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give clearance only to new drugs, so new combinations of familiar 
drugs did not have to be re-evaluated.
Intense product rivalry due to the high levels of investment in 
R&D, as new product introductions and incremental advances were 
introduced, forced pharmaceutical firms to engage in costly market-
ing campaigns in order to increase sales of a particular brand.31 
New products were especially important in the pharmaceutical indus-
try, as treatments of diseases were continually changing and new 
diseases were conceptualized by pharmaceutical marketing.32 Clinical 
research results and laboratory science were extensively used for 
(scientific) marketing purposes, particularly after the 1950s, and they 
were fundamental in shaping the drug market. The rise of scientific 
marketing, including medical information in promotional material 
for physicians, was closely related to the rapidly changing market 
caused by the introduction of new drugs. Marketing was also used to 
promote and redefine disease categories and to reshape prescrip-
tion patterns, and thereby create new markets and expand existing 
markets for establishing drugs. As Jean Paul Gaudillière analyzed, 
Ciba for example, transformed a tranquilizer into an antidepressant, 
redefined a new form of depression to be treated with antidepres-
sants, and focused on the idea of the preventive action of antidepres-
sants.33 By doing so, this company was able to build a market for 
antidepressants to treat a great number of patients suffering from 
mental problems.34
This product competition created increased rivalry in the drug 
industry for patented drugs and made it inevitable that firms would 
spend huge amounts of money on marketing in order to increase 
 31. The introduction of new products leads to more competition and, in turn, 
greater competition leads to more investment in R&D. Large R&D expenditures 
and a highly organized research effort are required to ensure a reasonable proba-
bility of success.
 32. The introduction of new drugs expanded the incidence of a disease, 
increasing the potential market for a drug through the detection of hidden (undi-
agnosed and untreated) patients. A new drug could alter and expand the definition 
of a disease category by focusing mainly on the treatment of risk via the detection 
and treatment of asymptomatic diseases. Another way to increase a drug’s market 
share was to seek new indications in other established disease categories or to 
claim that the new drug was safer and more efficient than existing drugs. For 
more on how new drugs influence the definition of disease, see Greene, Prescribing 
by Numbers. For the construction of mental disorders, see Shorter, History of 
Psychiatry; Rasmussen, On Speed; Healy, Let Them Eat Prozac; Herzberg, Happy 
Pills in America; Tone, Age of Anxiety.
 33. Gaudillière, “Marketing Loops.”
 34. Moon emphasized the creation of pharmaceutical markets by the drug 
industry, the role of the doctor in directing the hand of the market, and the 
introduction of new products in response to the experiences of physicians. Moon, 
Amphetamine Years.
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their sales.35 The introduction of numerous drugs with very similar 
therapeutic effects prompted companies to engage in major market-
ing efforts, as they could not compete on the basis of these effects.36  
If they wished to survive competition in the market, firms had to 
advertise their products heavily through different channels, including 
medical journals, films, radio, television, samples, and pharmaceuti-
cal representatives.37 This strategy resulted in an increase in advertis-
ing by firms in the 1950s from approximately 10 percent to roughly 
15 percent of sales to promote their innovations.38 The bulk of adver-
tising and promotional efforts went into persuading doctors to prescribe 
specific brand names; by the 1960s, more than 90 percent of the phar-
maceutical companies’ spending on marketing was aimed at doctors 
(only 10 percent was toward pharmacists and hospitals).39
This high level of advertising focused on doctors explains why, 
after 1938, decisions regarding patients’ use of prescription drugs 
were mainly in the hands of physicians, as they were the people pre-
scribing the drugs.40 Moreover, druggists were limited to issuing the 
trademark written on the prescription. During the 1950s, forty-four 
U.S. states enacted antisubstitution laws to prohibit brand substitu-
tion as a result of an alliance among physicians, pharmacists, and the 
brand-name pharmaceutical industry. These laws constrained the use 
of drugs sold under their generic names. In this situation, pharmacists 
 35. Rivalry through nonprice competition explains the high sales, advertising, 
and promotional expenditures (such as detail men, samples, journal advertising, 
mail, and so on), the emphasis on product development, and a closer alignment 
of research and (scientific) marketing activities. For the interplay between clinical 
research and promotion and professionalization of marketing, see Gaudillière and 
Thoms, Development of Scientific Marketing. Smith Kline and French was one of 
the first companies to use scientific progress as a marketing argument. Rasmussen, 
“Making the First Anti-Depressant.”
 36. For the different marketing strategies used by Ciba to promote the 
hypnotic drug Doriden during the 1950s and early 1960s, see Kessel, “‘Doriden 
von Ciba.’” For the professionalization of marketing activities by Shering after 
1945, see Gaudillière, “From Propaganda to Scientific Marketing.” For pharmaceu-
tical marketing in Germany between 1900 and 1980, see Thoms, “Standardizing 
Selling.”
 37. Most authors date the massive rise of advertising and modern marketing 
to the 1950s. However, in the case of German pharmaceutical companies, Thoms 
dates the emergence of pharmaceutical marketing at the core of business organiza-
tions to the 1930s. Thoms, “Standardizing Selling.”
 38. Temin, “Technology Regulation,” 431.
 39. Donohue, “History of Drug Advertising,” 668. The ethical drugs firms 
persuaded doctors and druggists of the superiority and reliability of their brands. 
Advertising for prescription medications became restricted to physicians only 
after Congress passed the Food and Drug Act of 1906. Liebenau, Medical Science 
and Medical Industry.
 40. For more on physicians’ autonomy, authority, and challenges in prescrib-
ing drugs, see Greene and Siegel Watkins, Prescribed.
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were legally bound by their state laws to fill prescriptions as written 
by doctors.41 However, purchase decisions of prescription drugs did 
not lie solely in the hands of physicians.42 In the 1940s, wide pre-
scription drug abuse started “adding up to an astonishing 15 million 
Americans by the late 1960s. The FDA estimated that half of all amphet-
amine pills in the 1960s were dispensed without the benefit of pre-
scriptions.”43 Moreover, David Herzberg indicates that consumers 
with problems of addiction pressured their doctors to change their 
types of drugs, increasing the number of refills or increasing the quan-
tity written on the prescriptions.44
These antisubstitution laws also encouraged firms to focus on mar-
keting and promotion. The proliferation of brands meant that adver-
tising became a significantly important strategy to increase sales.45 
Patent-holders used their patent period to promote their product’s brand 
name to physicians and tried to persuade them to use it for reasons of 
quality, rather than price.46 Leading pharmaceutical companies jus-
tified their enormous expenditures on promotion and advertising by 
arguing that a trademark gave a guarantee of purity and strength, as 
well as the quality of a well-known firm with a recognized reputation. 
The industry argued that drugs with the same generic name but differ-
ent proprietary names could differ in their therapeutic effects. These 
are the reasons the industry cited to oppose Senator Kefauver’s pro-
posal in S. 1552 to encourage physicians to prescribe drugs by their 
generic name. Generic prescribing would be unsafe because of the 
 41. The last of these antisubstitution laws was repealed in 1984; most had 
been repealed in the mid- to late 1970s. Greene, Generic, chapter 8.
 42. For the pressure applied to physicians by patients to prescribe new drugs, 
see Mintz, Therapeutic Nightmare. For the active role of women in demanding 
prescriptions for minor tranquilizers, see Smith, Social History of the Minor Tran-
quilizers. For the contraceptive pill in Germany starting in the late 1960s, see Thoms, 
“Contraceptive Pill.” For Spain, see Ignaciuk, Ortiz-Gómez, and Rodriguez-Ocaña, 
“Doctors, Women and the Circulation of Knowledge.”
 43. Herzberg, “Busted for Blockbusters,” 214.
 44. Ibid.
 45. Consumers could self-medicate because all drugs were promoted directly 
to consumers until 1938, when the only drugs for which prescriptions were 
needed were some narcotics and cocaine. Congress passed the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act in 1938, which restricted the consumers’ role and reduced that 
of pharmacists in the selection of drugs, making the demand for prescription drugs 
more inelastic than it would have been without this FDA regulation. As a result, 
after 1938, brand-name drug firms greatly increased their advertising and promo-
tion to physicians. See Temin, “Technology, Regulation”; Statman and Tyebjee, 
“Strategic Responses”; Temin, “Origin of Compulsory,” 97–98.
 46. Bond and Lean demonstrated the promotion of the brand name to foster 
physician loyalty during the patent period. Bond and Lean, Economic Report on 
Sales. The persistence of loyalty to a branded drug maintained the position of a 
patented drug even after the patent expired. Statman, “Effect of Patent Expiration”; 
Statman and Tyebjee, “Trademarks, Patents, and Innovation.”
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existence of substandard drugs sold under generic names, with sub-
stitution being defined as a health hazard. It was argued that brand-
name products inspired confidence among physicians, and this then 
explained the high percentage of drugs prescribed by brand name.47 
In addition, a risk-averse physician would not prescribe a drug by its 
generic name until its efficacy was proved. The private doctor would 
be much more inclined to trust the trademark on the assumption that 
the relevant company would be safe. They, therefore, placed their 
trust in firms’ sizes and reputations, since they had no way of know-
ing the quality of all the manufacturers.48 Moreover, doctors were 
not sensitive to price differences, and even tended to be unaware 
of prices. Habit, therefore, played a major role in physicians’ pre-
scription practices.49 The result was that doctors prescribed only 
a few of the many available brand-name drugs—that is, the most 
heavily advertised drugs, which were those of the big companies—
and this meant that smaller firms never developed the capacity to 
finance selling campaigns.
For a small company, it was very difficult to finance a selling 
campaign.50 Promotional expenditures were far greater than those for 
R&D. For example, the amount spent on R&D in 1958 by the twenty 
largest companies with the highest annual sales of drugs represented 
6.4 percent of their total pharmaceutical sales ($2.3 billion).51 This 
proportion was not particularly high, given that the companies’ selling 
expenses were 24 percent (one-third of the total cost of production52) 
and net profits were 13.1 percent.53 These data (see table 1) show that 
selling costs were almost four times that of research expenses.
 47. However, sales promotion for drugs sold mainly to hospitals was very low. 
Leffler, “Persuasion or Information?,” 53–54.
 48. By the early 1960s, the generic name was not a useful tool for establishing 
the interchangeability among drug products bearing the same generic drug name. 
Greene, Generic, 48.
 49. Kendall, Ng, and Schoner, “Consumer Responses”; Temin, “Taking Your 
Medicine,” 102–106.
 50. It cost about $750 million per year in 1958. Silverman, Drugging of the 
Americas, 121; Clarkson, “Use of Pharmaceutical Profitability Measures.”
 51. A small number of companies produced a high percentage of innovations. 
Achilladelis and Antonakis, “Dynamics of Technological Innovation.” The high 
cost of R&D excluded small firms from using it on a sufficiently large scale to 
expect success and explains the dominance of large companies in drug research. 
Schwartzman, Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry, chapter 5.
 52. There were some firms with higher selling and distribution costs, such as 
Upjohn with a percentage of 28.8, or Schering with a percentage equal to 32.7 of 
their sales revenue. Testimony by Mr. Brown, president of Schering; Mr. Upjohn, 
president of Upjohn Company; and Senator Kefauver, “Administered Prices,” 
86th Cong., 1960, 1st Session, part 14, 1960.
 53. Testimony by Senator Kefauver, “Administered Prices,” 86th Cong., 1960, 
2nd Session, part 19, 1960.
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2016.43
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 92.185.99.100, on 08 Jun 2017 at 16:09:21, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
295Ethical Pharmaceutical Industry
In sum, big pharmaceutical companies integrated marketing tech-
niques with R&D activities to increase their market shares and to 
withstand competition from drugs that were chemically different but 
offered the same therapies. This explains the high rate of product 
obsolescence and rapidly growing markets, which stimulated compe-
tition and provided an impetus to innovate.54 In turn, the profitability 
of investments in drug R&D and marketing led to more innovation 
and more drugs.55
In the tranquilizer sector, there were many medications but not 
many significant improvements, although a small reduction in the 
incidence of side effects could be demonstrated with the new drugs. 
For example, although there were several types of tranquilizers, 
medical opinion inclined to the view that the later modifications of 
the original phenothiazines were therapeutically similar to the first 
ones that were released. The advances made following the discovery 
of chlorpromazine, the first of the antipsychotics, were small and 
incremental. There were drugs with similar properties patented and 
marketed as competing products that were as effective but had fewer 
or different side effects.56
Table 1. Breakdown of sales dollar, 20 major drug companies, 1958 (in percent 
of sales*)
20 Drug  
Companies







Net profit 13.1 17.2 20.4 14.7 12.7
Taxes 13 20 23.4 15.9 12.9
Selling expenses 24 19.5 27.8 24 33.9
General &  
administrative  
expenses
11.2 10.9 6.5 14.9 7.4
R&D expenses 6.4 8.9 2.7 3.2 13.9***
Cost of goods ** 32.3 23.5 19.2 27.3 19.2
Source: “Administered Prices,” 86th Cong., 1960, 2nd session, part 16, at 9,176–9,177.
Note: * = includes royalties and other income. ** = includes labor costs, material costs, bottling, finishing 
into tablets or capsules, and depreciation on plant. *** 3 percent of the 13.9 is for the patents to the 
Swiss company, with U.S. research being about 10 percent.
 54. Mahoney, Merchants of Life; Marks, Progress of Experiment.
 55. In 1958, among the 500 largest industrial corporations in terms of total 
sales, the next pharmaceutical companies were among the 150 highest profit cor-
porations in terms of profits on investment (as reported by Fortune magazine, 
volume 60 (2), August 1959: American Home Products, Smith Kline and French, 
Schering, Parke Davis, Upjohn, Pfizer, Merck, Abbott, Bristol-Myers, and Eli Lilly. 
Carter Products, if it had sales sufficiently large to put it among the 500 largest, would 
rank the leading company). “Administered Prices,” 86th Cong., 1960, 2nd Session, 
part 16, at 8,945.
 56. Testimony by Dr. Lehmann, “Administered Prices,” 86th Cong., 1960, 
2nd Session, part 16, at 9,029; Steele, “Monopoly and Competition,” 156.
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The importance of promotional expenses for a particular drug 
is well illustrated in this sector. Tranquilizer advertising was the 
major component of medical advertising, as indicated by the exec-
utive director of the National Committee Against Mental Illness. 
Miltown and Equanil, for example, were heavily advertised as a 
condition of Wyeth’s license with Carter: Wyeth would spend at 
least 20 percent of total meprobamate sales revenue on its promotion. 
Despite its high price, Miltown was the most widely used. It was 
the first psychotropic blockbuster and the fastest-selling drug in 
U.S. history.57
The cost of Miltown per tablet for a 1,000-tablet production 
run is shown in table 2. Advertising, promotion, and clinical sam-
ples cost one cent per tablet—Carter’s total advertising and promo-
tion cost for Miltown was $9.20 per year per doctor in 1959—as 
compared to seven-tenths of one cent, which was the manufactur-
ing cost per tablet, or about one-and-a-half times more. Research 
and royalties were four-tenths of a cent per tablet, which was less 
than half the expenditure for advertising and promotion. The net 
profit for the manufacture and sale of Miltown was 23 percent per 
tablet.
Although there was little overuse of potent tranquilizers—patients 
did not like to take them owing to their unpleasant side effects—the 
less potent ones were overused to a tremendous degree. The minor 
tranquilizers were everywhere in the popular media, thanks to intense 
marketing and the widespread view that anxiety was not so much 
a sign of mental illness as a symbol of success.58 The consumerist 
culture also explains why these drugs were initially quite popular.59 
 57. Tone, Age of Anxiety. Meprobamate was popularized through a major 
advertising campaign. Herzberg, Happy Pills in America, 38–39. By 1957 more 
than 36 million prescriptions had been filled for meprobamate in the United States 
alone. Tone, “Tranquilizers on Trial,” 157. Carter had been involved in aggressive 
advertisings since the 1930s. Herzberg, Happy Pills in America, 21.
 58. In cases of milder emotional disturbances, a great number of patients 
(from 20 percent to 40 percent) would improve with any kind of a pill because of 
the so-called placebo effect. This also holds true for depression. Testimony by 
Dr. Lehmann, “Administered Prices,” 86th Cong., 1960, 2nd Session, part 16, at 
9,028 and 9,072.
 59. The minor tranquilizers created a new market because the use of barbi-
turates did not decline when the former arrived on the market. The explosive 
rise of minor tranquilizers was carried out by doctors prescribing nonpsychiatrics. 
Rasmussen, On Speed. For Miltown’s success as a consumer commodity and the 
creation of America’s tranquilizer culture, see Tone, Age of Anxiety. For the idea 
that minor tranquilizers created a psychotropic culture from the mid-1950s, see 
Metzl, Prozac on the Couch. For the increase in the prescribing of minor tranquil-
izers being caused by social reasons rather than medical ones, see Smith, Social 
History of the Minor Tranquilizers.
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The abuse of minor tranquilizers—especially of meprobamate—was 
remarkable, although there was little evidence that the drug was 
qualitatively different in its clinical effects from a number of other 
hypnotics, including barbiturates.60 The danger with this practice was 
the problem of addiction; for example, large doses of meprobamate 
(Miltown, Equanil, and various other trade names) over a long period 
of time could cause addiction.
The development, introduction, and marketing of potent and danger-
ous drugs increased concerns regarding the regulation of the industry as 
a means to protect consumers. At this time, there was major government 
and public concerns regarding drug safety regulation, the abundance 
of me-too drugs, and industry marketing practices. Kefauver’s hearings 
were initially predicated on concerns about monopolistic pricing, but 
as the hearings continued attention focused increasingly on pharma-
ceutical marketing, consumer safety, and drug efficacy. Specifically, 
Kefauver’s greatest achievement was the Kefauver–Harris Drug Act of 
1962 (also called the drug amendments) because it directly related to 
the drug industry and health issues. This was the first major change of 
the preceding law: the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938. 
This act required manufacturers to show that a drug was safe, and 
drugs had to receive the FDA’s approval before they could be marketed. 
The Drug Act of 1962 was one of the most significant consumer safety 
laws of the twentieth century: to receive approval by the FDA, a new 
Table 2. Miltown costs and profit per tablet by Carter, March 31, 1959 (cents 
per tablet)
Carter receives from wholesaler 5.1
Manufacturing costs 0.7 17.9%
Selling expense and administration* 0.4 10.3%
Advertising, promotion and clinical samples* 1.0 25.6%
Research and royalties* 0.4 10.3%
Income taxes* 1.4 35.90%
Total cost per tablet 3.9 100%
Net profit 1.2
Source: “Administered Prices,” 86th Cong., 1960, 2nd session, part 16, at 9,161.
Notes: * = these expense items are average for Carter’s ethical drug business.
 60. There was no evidence that meprobamate was different from a placebo in 
treating anxiety in psychiatric outpatients, although it was better than a placebo in 
hospitalized neurotic and psychotic patients. Laties and Weiss, “Critical Review of 
the Efficacy of Meprobamate.” For example, Compazine—a drug effective for severe 
disturbances—was also sold for milder mental and emotional disturbances, even 
though it had not been shown to be as effective against mild disturbances, as reported 
in a study by Lasagna, a doctor at Johns Hopkins. “Administered Prices,” 86th Cong., 
1960, part 17, at 9,507.
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drug’s efficacy and safety had to be demonstrated prior to marketing.61 
All drugs approved between 1938 and 1962 were reviewed under the 
new law, and those which were found to be ineffective were removed 
from the market. Thus, the drug hearings triggered major progress for 
consumer safety legislation and expanded the FDA’s authority over 
the testing, manufacturing, and marketing of new drugs.62 Furthermore, 
Kefauver’s investigation encouraged crucial debates on contemporary 
decisions in U.S. health policy and practice.63
As a result of the hearings held by the Subcommittee on Antitrust 
and Monopoly, Kefauver introduced a bill (S. 1552) to the subcommit-
tee in 1961 designed to increase competition, to enhance the use of 
generic names, and to reform the patent system. It introduced compul-
sory licensing and the granting of patents only in relation to those drugs 
that were true innovations (and not me-too drugs). The bill met with 
strong resistance from two Democratic senators (Everett Dirksen and 
Roman Hruska), the American Medical Association, and the Pharma-
ceutical Manufacturers’ Association (PMA), the industry’s trade associ-
ation. The PMA included only 140 firms from among more than 1,300 
mainly medium- and large-size firms that produced almost 95 percent 
of all sales of prescription drug in 1960. President John Kennedy and 
the White House staff were also reluctant to support the bill. Two of 
the arguments advanced by the PMA to oppose the charges made by 
Kefauver were: (1) the superiority of the U.S. free enterprise model, and 
(2) the benefits of the competitive system as the best asset in the strug-
gle against Communism.64 Finally, however, Kennedy signed the bill 
into law in October 1962 (the Kefauver–Harris Drug Act), but the pat-
ent provisions were rejected.65 The Kefauver–Harris Drug Act was the 
 61. This law was passed following the thalidomide disaster (a drug intro-
duced in several foreign countries but not the United States), in which thousands 
of children were born with birth defects. For a review of the thalidomide disaster 
and regulatory reform, see Carpenter, Reputation and Power, chapter 4.
 62. As Greene and Podolsky wrote: “Senator Kefauver’s investigation of 
‘Administered Prices in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Pharmaceutical Promo-
tion and Physician Education in Postwar America’ in many ways served as the 
end of the unblemished era of the wonder drug.” Greene and Podolsky, “Keeping 
Modern in Medicine,” 357.
 63. Scroop, “Faded Passion?”; Tobbell, “Who’s Winning the Human Race?,” 431.
 64. The efficacy requirement included in the drug amendments favored the 
economic position of PMA members’ companies because it eliminated many fringe 
manufacturers from the marketplace. For more on the political strategy to under-
mine regulatory reform and the alliances the drug industry built among academics, 
physicians, and the American Medical Association, see Tobbell, “‘Who’s Winning 
the Human Race?’”
 65. The provisions included reducing the then-existing seventeen-year patent 
terms, adding compulsory licensing after three years of patent protection, and giv-
ing patents combinations and modifications of existing products only if they were 
therapeutically superior to the original products.
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first legislation to regulate the efficacy and safety of new drug products 
and reflected changes in the U.S. economy toward a politics of consump-
tion. Regulation of pharmaceuticals became a national problem in 
the United States following Kefauver’s hearings.66
The Rise of the Tranquilizer Sector in the United States
In the 1950s mental illness was a major health issue in the United 
States, with at least 25 percent of visits to doctors due to mental health 
problems,67 and filling more than half the hospital beds in the country. 
Around 10 percent of Americans suffered from some form of mental ill-
ness, which cost the nation $3 billion a year.68 In 1958 sales of tranquil-
izers at the manufacturers’ level were estimated at nearly $200 million 
a year (total annual sales of drugs for the United States were roughly 
$1.8 billion).69
The introduction of effective drug therapy and its extensive use 
in the treatment of the mentally ill began in the 1950s. It was widely 
used to treat psychosis, depression, anxiety, and mania.70 This changed 
the course of psychiatry, as practitioners began to consider both psy-
chotherapy and psychopharmacology as regular treatments.71 Interest-
ingly, the discovery of these drugs was accidental and began with the 
 66. Greene and Podolski, “Reform, Regulation, and Pharmaceuticals”; Steele 
“Fortunes of Economic Reform Legislation”; Carpenter, Reputation and Power; 
Greene and Watkins, Prescribed, 75–77; Tobbell, “Pharmaceutical Politics,” 
123–139.
 67. Rasmussen, On Speed, 114.
 68. Testimony by Mike Gorman, “Administered Prices,” 86th Cong., 1960, 
2nd session, part 16, at 8,985.
 69. Silverman and Lee, Pills, Profits and Politics, 327.
 70. There are several studies that conclude that the use of psychopharmacol-
ogy to treat mental illness became formalized in the 1950s and led to the deinsti-
tutionalization movement that gathered momentum from the 1960s onward. The 
number of patients in mental hospitals began to decline, reflecting the introduc-
tion of psychopharmacology in the treatment of mental illness. The number 
of institutionalized mentally ill people in the United States dropped from a peak 
of 560,000 (in state and county mental hospitals, which accounted for almost 
half of all mental patients) to about 339,000 in 1970 (accounting for less than 
10 percent of all mental patients). Schwartzman, Innovation in the Pharmaceuti-
cal Industry, 21; Gronfein, Psychotropic Drugs, 437; Bachrach, State of the State 
Mental Hospital, 93; Tone, Age of Anxiety, 13; Herzberg, Happy Pills in America, 18. 
However, on this subject there is a debate about whether the introduction of 
psychopharmacology or the move to deinstitutionalize mental healthcare came 
first. For the argument that the asylum population began to fall much earlier than 
the introduction of chlorpromazine, see Healy, Creation of Psychopharmacology. 
For the idea that the introduction of psychotropic drugs was not statistically 
significant to explain deinstitutionalization trends, see Mechanic and Rochefort, 
“Deinstitutionalization.”
 71. Ban, “Fifty Years Chlorpromazine.”
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synthesis of a number of phenothiazine antihistamines in the 1940s, 
which manufacturers then discovered were effective sedatives.72
The arrival of new drugs capable of altering moods and mental 
illness challenged ideas about psychiatry and mental disorders, which 
were now attributed to brain chemistry. Anxiety was the common 
term used to refer to mental problems treated on an outpatient basis. 
The new psychiatry paradigm led to a conception of anxiety as a 
general psychic consequence of the demands and pace of conditions 
of modern life. Because anxiety was common and related to many ills, 
the introduction of drugs to treat problems of generalized stress and 
to enhance well-being created a mass market, and doctors became 
increasingly oriented toward prescribing pharmaceuticals.73 This 
new market included those populations who began to think that mental 
distress could be treatable by drugs, having been persuaded by public 
relations and marketing efforts to grab the consumers’ attention.74 
The popularity of these drugs explains psychiatry’s pharmacologi-
cal revolution, which began in the 1950s. In many publications from 
those years, one can read about the value of minor tranquilizers for 
a great number of life problems, including tension, nerves, irritability, 
menstrual stress, psychosomatic symptoms, insomnia, menopause, 
juvenile delinquency, family and marital difficulties, and problems 
at work.
At the end of the 1950s, there were three main classes of patented 
tranquilizers sold under a generic name or a brand name (table 3): 
phenothiazine derivatives (the most common of which were Com-
pazine and Thorazine); alkaloids of Rauwolfia serpentina (the most 
important was reserpine); and finally, a miscellaneous group, princi-
pal among which was meprobamate. All of these drugs, termed eth-
ical drugs, were sold by prescription. The first two groups included 
potent tranquilizers—or major tranquilizers or antipsychotics—that 
were largely used for the treatment of those hospitalized and other 
seriously ill mental patients. These proved to be extremely effective in 
combating major mental diseases. The other classes of tranquilizers, 
which received the most publicity, were usually simple sedatives, 
 72. Barbiturates and opiates were some of the chemical treatments used to 
treat anxiety before the arrival of minor tranquilizers. Tone, Age of Anxiety.
 73. Sales of tranquilizers at the manufacturers’ level were estimated at nearly 
$200 million a year. Herzberg, Happy Pills in America, Appendix B, 209.
 74. Smith, Social History of the Minor Tranquilizers, 67, points out the 
following examples: “‘Wonder Drug’ (Time, 1954); ‘Happiness Pills’ (Newsweek, 
1956); ‘Aspirin for the Soul’ (Changing Times, 1956); ‘Mental Laxatives’ (Nation, 
1956); ‘Don’t-Give-A-Damn Pills’ (Time, 1956); ‘Peace of Mind Drugs’ (Mental 
Health, 1957), and even ‘Turkish Bath in a Tablet’ (Reader’s Digest, 1962).” The lit-
erature became more critical over the years. Smith, Social History of the Minor 
Tranquilizers, 128.
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and their effects were mainly of a symptomatic nature (that is, mild 
tranquilizers). They were advertised for states of anxiety or tension 
and were suitable for treating the nonpsychotic patient.75
Table 3. Major marketers of mental drugs, 1958








sales rate  
(millions  
dollar)
Price to  
druggist  
(50 tablets)
Phenothiazine derivatives (potent tranquilizers)
Chlorpromazine 1954 SKF Thorazine 25 3.03
Prochlorperazine 1956 SKF Compazine 20 3.03
Promazine 1957 Wyeth Division  
of AHP
Sparine* 15 3.00
Perphenazine Schering Trilafon 1
Pecazine 1957 Warner-Lambert Pacatal 6
Vesprin < 1
Substituted propanedoils (muscle relaxants, mild tranquilizers)
Meprobamate 1955 Wallace Division  
of Carter  
Products, Inc.
Miltown 15 3.25
Wyeth Division  
of AHP
Equanil 35–40 3.25
Phenaglycodol Eli Lilly Ultran 3–4
Diphenylmethane derivatives (basically antihistamine products, mild tranquilizers)
Hydroxycine 1956 Pfizer Atarax 9
Benzilate  
hydrochloride
1957 Merck Suavitil < 1
Azacycolonol 1955 Vick Frenquel < 1
Rauwolfia alkaloids (potent tranquilizers)
Reserpine 1954 Ciba Serpasil 15 2.25
Lilly Sandril 1.92
Merck Roxanoid 1.91
Parke, David Serfin 1.92







Many sellers Generic  
name
Source: “Administered Prices,” 86th Cong., 1960, 2nd session, part 16, at 8,887.
Note: * Sparine is half as potent as Thorazine, which is less potent than Vesprin. Compazine and 
Trilafon are more potent than Thorazine: the more potent the phenothiazine derivatives, the fewer 
side effects produced. Rauwolfia derivatives are safe compounds; serious side effects have been rare.
 75. The use of minor tranquilizers increased dramatically through the early 
1970s, and they maintained their overall position among the nation’s most popular 
medicines. Thus, it is estimated that well more than one hundred million prescrip-
tions were filled for minor tranquilizers yearly in the mid-1970s. Herzberg, Happy 
Pills in America, 39. For a discussion of the impact of minor tranquilizers on soci-
ety and medicine itself, see Smith, Social History of the Minor Tranquilizers.
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In 1959 the most significant firm selling phenothiazine derivatives 
in the United States was the American company Smith Kline & French 
(SKF), which was primarily a producer of ethical drug specialties.76 
During the late 1940s, SKF was interested in researching a compound 
that might potentiate other drugs, especially sedatives. In 1952 the 
French company Rhône-Poulenc discovered a new allergy drug it 
called chlorpromazine, which slowed down bodily processes. The 
development of this drug came from an interest in the 1940s in anti-
histamines, as they were effective sedatives.77 In 1952 SKF obtained 
an exclusive license from Rhône-Poulenc to use, sell, and distribute the 
compound chlorpromazine in specialty form only. Rhône-Poulenc, 
which had applied in 1951, obtained the U.S. patent rights on July 14, 
1953.78 Thorazine was the trade name chosen by SKF for chlor-
promazine; the product went on sale in 1954.79 The introduction of 
chlorpromazine was a major milestone in the treatment of psychotic 
patients,80 and Thorazine became the first widely available antipsy-
chotic medication. In 1952 SKF also obtained a license from the French 
company to sell prochlorperazine under the trademark Compazine— 
a phenothiazine compound similar to chlorpromazine but much more 
potent. The patent was issued to Rhône-Poulenc in September 1959. 
SKF was the only domestic supply source for Thorazine and Com-
pazine, and it had estimated sales of $24 million of Thorazine and 
$20 million of Compazine, representing around 20 percent of the 
tranquilizer market in 1958 and around 60 percent of phenothiazine 
derivatives (see table 3).81 SKF signed more patent licensing contracts 
with Rhône-Poulenc. In 1956 SKF entered into an agreement with the 
French company to use Thorazine in combination with other products. 
That new product was named Thoradex.
Rhône-Poulenc also signed patent licensing contracts with other com-
panies, such as with American Home Products Corp. (hereafter AHP), 
 76. Seventy percent of the sales of this company came from items that affect 
the central nervous system: tranquilizers such as Thorazine (30 percent), Com-
pazine , and Thoradex, and stimulants like Benzedrine, Dexedrine, and Dexamyl. 
“The remaining 30 percent came from hormones and sulfur drugs, plus specialties 
to treat nasal, skin, allergy, and blood pressure disorders.” “Administered Prices,” 
86th Cong., 1960, 2nd Session, part 17, at 9,481.
 77. Swazey, Chlorpromazine in Psychiatry.
 78. SKF obtained an exclusive license before the patent was obtained but 
after Rhône-Poulenc had applied for the license in 1951. The reason for offering a 
licensing agreement to SKF was that Rhône-Poulenc lacked the means to market 
chlorpromazine in the United States. Rasmussen, On Speed, 144.
 79. By 1956 more than two million patients had been prescribed chlorprom-
azine. Harcourt, “Reducing Mass Incarceration,” 65.
 80. The antidepressant era began after the discovery of chlorpromazine. 
Healy, Antidepressant Era.
 81. “Administered Prices,” 86th Cong., 1960, 2nd session, part 16, at 8,912.
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which received an exclusive license in 1957 to sell promazine (a molec-
ular modification of the phenothiazine nucleus). Through its Wyeth 
Laboratories Division, AHP offered promazine under the brand name 
Sparine; it was a potent tranquilizer for patients seriously agitated 
with delirium tremens.
In 1952 reserpine, one of the first antidepressants introduced 
commercially in the United States, was isolated in Switzerland 
by Ciba from the dried root of Rauwolfia serpentine. This root had 
been used medicinally in Europe for more than three hundred years 
for the treatment of anxiety states, but it was in 1933 that a group of 
Indian researchers reported its value as a hypotensive agent. Ciba 
Pharmaceutical Company (a wholly owned subsidiary of Ciba) held 
the patent starting in 1956, and it sold reserpine under the trade name 
Serpasil. Several firms also sold reserpine, as we explain in the next 
section.
Meprobamate was the first minor tranquilizer and the most sold in 
1958 (see table 3).82 Dr. Frank Berger accidentally discovered mephe-
nesin, a muscular relaxant, in England; eleven years later, he and his 
colleague, Dr. Bernard Ludwig, discovered a molecular modification 
of mephenesin—meprobamate—as a tranquilizer. They filed an appli-
cation in 1950, and the patent rights to meprobamate were assigned 
in 1955 to Carter Products Inc., which sold the drug in finished form 
under the trademark Miltown through its ethical drug division, Wallace 
Laboratories. Carter licensed one other firm, AHP, through its Wyeth 
Division, to sell finished meprobamate in the United States under the 
trademark Equanil.83
Patents and Price Competition in the Tranquilizer Sector
In the tranquilizer sector, all drugs were patented. In principle, only 
the owner of a patent—thus, a monopolist—could manufacture and 
sell the relevant product; this is, the patented drug. However, pat-
ent licensing agreements were used in the pharmaceutical industry. 
Licensing to other firms meant that more than one firm could produce 
and sell the product. One common practice, as noted earlier, was to 
license only to big firms, with smaller firms being excluded from 
licensing contracts. Usually, the patent-holder decided not to license 
 82. For the history of the best-selling psychotropic drug in American history, 
see Tone, “Tranquilizers on Trial.” For the history of Miltown, in particular, see 
Tone, “Making of Miltown,” 27.
 83. Wyeth paid Carter $1.9 million in royalties in 1957. Carter had neither 
connections to physicians nor the money necessary to hire salesmen to create them. 
However, AHP had a large force of detail men.
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small firms so as to exclude them from competition. This was because 
of their lower costs: there were no economies of scale in production 
and small firms did not commit significant resources to R&D and mar-
keting, which were two barriers to entry in the prescription retail 
market. With lower costs, if smaller firms had access to bulk powders, 
they could sell licensed drugs cheaper than the licensor. This situa-
tion was only possible if the licensor decided to give a license to a 
small firm, or in those few cases in which the bulk drugs were avail-
able to all makers of preparations containing them. This happened 
when licensing contracts did not include field-of-use restrictions.84
However, another frequent practice was for patent licensing con-
tracts to include a restrictive clause, specifically a field-of-use restric-
tion; that is, a provision stipulating that the firm would be granted a 
license only to make and sell in final packaged form, not in bulk form. 
Therefore, if the patent licensing contract included this restriction, 
small firms were not allowed to buy ingredients in bulk and could 
not manufacture tablets but had to purchase the drugs exclusively in 
finished packaged form from the licensees and the patent holder, and 
thus at a higher price. As a result, in most cases, the only producers 
were those big firms that held patents on the drug ingredients and the 
licensees.
In this section, we examine whether field-of-use restrictions in pat-
ent licensing contracts truly prevented competition in the tranquil-
izer sector. This restrictive clause was included in all patent licensing 
contracts regarding the main new tranquilizers discovered in the 
1950s, except for reserpine. Thus, for example, there were field-of-use 
restrictions prohibiting licensees to sell in bulk form in the licens-
ing contracts that Rhône-Poulenc issued to SKF to manufacture and 
sell the drug chlorpromazine under the trademark Thorazine and the 
drug prochlorperazine; in the contract that Rhône-Poulenc signed 
with Wyeth, a subsidiary of AHP, to produce Phenergan and Sparine; 
and in the contract that Carter Products signed with Wyeth to sell 
meprobamate under the trademark Equanil.
We studied whether field-of-use restrictions in patent licensing 
contracts truly prevented competition in two different markets in which 
 84. Steele, “Monopoly and Competition.” Patent interferences also frequently 
took place between big companies. When there was patent interference, the final 
result was very likely to be unpatentability. Big companies that researched along 
similar lines often pursued a strategy that allowed a patent applicant to obtain the 
patent; thus, they settled claims privately. All but one firm would withdraw from 
the interference and obtain licensing privileges through a cross-licensing arrange-
ment, thereby avoiding patent testing and careful scrutiny of a patent application. 
Cross-licensing was a system whereby the product could be marketed while the 
battle for the patent went on, and the parties ensured the continued right to market 
the new compounds.
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ethical tranquilizers could be sold: the retail market (which included 
chain drug stores, mass merchandizers, independent pharmacies, super-
market pharmacies, and mail order pharmacies) and the institutional 
market (private nonprofit hospitals, state and local governmental hos-
pitals, clinics, dispensaries, and federal agencies). In the former, as 
noted earlier, the people who usually decided which drugs to pre-
scribe were doctors, and doctors tended not to care about the prices 
of the drugs they prescribed.
However, the institutional market was price-sensitive. In this sub-
market, there was no longer a captive aspect to the market, and 
the manufacturer had to compete on a generic basis. Thus, in the 
case of hospitals, hospital pharmacists were encouraged to prescribe 
those products listed on the hospital’s formulary, and hospital phy-
sicians agreed that prescriptions written under a brand name should 
be interpreted as if they were generic prescriptions, unless the physi-
cian indicated otherwise.85 The idea was not only to reduce costs but 
also to avoid duplication in a pharmacist’s orders and duplication of 
drug names. A hospital formulary committee and the chief pharma-
cist would decide on the drugs required, and quantity purchases were 
made on a best-bid basis.86 Hence, in contrast to the retail submarket, 
in which physicians and pharmacists did not have any incentive to 
prescribe the cheapest drug, in the institutional submarket there was 
a motivation to seek price cuts.87
Price Competition in the Retail Market
A field-of-use restriction in a patent licensing agreement could the-
oretically have been a solution to erode price competition and to 
increase a company’s market share in the pharmaceutical market in 
which product competition was intense. In order to understand the 
relationship between restrictive licensing clauses and price competi-
tion in the retail market, we distinguished three different possible sit-
uations, dependent on the number of firms producing finished drugs 
 85. Memorandum 18 of the National Pharmaceutical Council, 1957, “Admin-
istered Prices,” 86th Cong., 1960, 2nd Session, part. 21, at 11,835–11,836. The 
formulary committee consisted of representatives of the several departments of the 
medical staff as well as the apothecary-in-chief. Ibid, at 11,573.
 86. The hospital formulary was necessary to guarantee the quality of the drugs 
dispensed, as there were clinically significant differences between pharmaceutical 
products with the same generic name. The National Pharmaceutical Council was 
against the hospital formulary system because the formularies constituted substi-
tution. Greene, Generic.
 87. In 1970, retail pharmacies accounted for 74.5 percent of manufacturers’ 
domestic sales, hospitals accounted for 14.4 percent, and government agencies for 
the rest. Schwartzman, Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 25.
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from bulk powder active ingredients: those in which there was only 
one producer; those in which there were a few big firms producing 
the drug; and those with several manufacturers, both large and small. 
The distinction between these three scenarios is important in order 
to understand the different pricing policies of the large drug firms in 
the tranquilizer sector.
The first scenario is one in which only one company produced 
the drug; this happened with phenothiazine derivatives. In this case, 
Rhône-Poulenc, the owner of the patent, was a foreign company that 
did not operate in the United States, so it granted an exclusive license 
to SFK to manufacture a drug sold under its own brand name. The 
licensing contract included a field-of-use restriction that specified that 
SFK could not sell the drug in bulk form to other competitors; only 
it had access to the production process in the United States. We find 
this first situation in the contracts that Rhône-Poulenc signed with 
SKF to produce chlorpromazine and prochlorperazine under the trade 
names Thorazine and Compazine. Smith Kline and French estab-
lished a price—$3.09—for wholesale druggists (50-mg Thorazine tab-
let in quantities of five hundred tablets), plus 15 percent margin to 
retail druggists (that is, $3.64, which was the price retail druggists 
paid for it). This price remained the same from 1954 to 1969. This 
situation was also found with the products Phenergan and Sparine, 
sold only by Wyeth in the United States at a price to retail druggists 
of $3 in 1958 (for fifty tablets). It is obvious that no price competition 
existed in this first scenario, in which there was only one firm pro-
ducing and selling the patented drug in the U.S. market.
We found in the second scenario that there were only a few big 
firms with access to the drug in bulk form. This was the case with 
the tranquilizer meprobamate. As noted in the previous section, only 
two firms manufactured this patented drug: Carter, the patent holder, 
and Wyeth, the licensee. The licensing contract included a restriction 
indicating that Wyeth would make no sales of bulk powder to any 
other companies, although it had access to the production process; 
Wyeth tableted and bottled the bulk powder sold to them by Carter. 
In this case, a lack of price competition was encountered in the retail 
prescription market, because the licensor and its licensee pursued 
the strategy of offering the same price for the same drug. The bulk 
powder sale of meprobamate was reserved for Carter, which, through 
its Wallace Division, sold the drug under the trade name Miltown. 
American Home Products Corp., through the Wyeth Division, sold 
meprobamate under a license that it entered into with Carter in 1955 to 
produce the drug under the brand name Equanil. The price of Miltown 
was established in line with the competition, determined in April 
1955, and the product was marketed the following month. Carter sold 
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Miltown to wholesaler druggists at 5.2 cents a tablet; retail druggists 
paid the wholesaler 6.5 cents; and the final price to consumers was 
10.8 cents per tablet. The price of Miltown remained the same from 
1955 to 1960.88 Wyeth set identical prices for Equanil, even though it 
had to make royalty payments of 13 cents to Carter, and its manufac-
turing costs were much higher than Carter’s ($0.007 and $0.015 per 
tablet, respectively).89
The tactic of big companies in the prescription retail market of 
pricing the same patented drug at the same level is also found in the 
third case, in which there were several firms, both large and small, 
involved in pharmaceutical manufacturing with access to drug powder. 
The patented drug was marketed under both different brand names 
and generic names. We find this third scenario in the case of reserpine, 
a drug patented by Ciba and in which the licensing contract did not 
include a field-of-use restriction. In other words, Ciba decided to allow 
its licensees to sell the drug in bulk powder form to small firms. Hence, 
smaller firms could manufacture their own tablets and capsules, con-
verting the bulk drug into finished packaged tablets (tableting, bot-
tling, packaging, and labeling), and selling them either generically or 
under their own brand names and at their own prices.
With the drug reserpine, for example, Ciba charged a wholesale 
price of $39.50 per bottle of one thousand (25-milligram) tablets. The 
final price to the consumer was $65.83, given a druggist’s mark-up of 
40 percent on the selling price. In contrast, some larger manufacturers 
including Lilly, Merck, Parke, Davis, Squibb, and Upjohn, all of which 
obtained their licenses from Ciba, sold reserpine at the same price, 
which was much lower than that charged by Ciba. Smaller firms, with 
no advertising costs, reduced prices to as much as 90 percent below 
Ciba’s price. The lower costs for smaller firms allowed them to reduce 
their prices to about $1.91 per fifty tablets; Carter’s fixed sale price to 
wholesale druggists, for example, was $2.60 per bottle of fifty capsules 
and $3.25 to retailers. Some small firms, such as Panray Corporation, 
 88. Use of Miltown and Equanil fell off dramatically in the early 1960s after 
news pointed out little reliable evidence for efficacy of these drugs apart from a 
placebo effect. They were struck from the U.S. Pharmacopeia in 1964. Herzberg, 
Happy Pills in America, 39. The successor drugs were Librium and Valium, which 
became available to physicians in the early 1960s.
 89. Carter had the product made by five manufacturers of its own selection to 
whom it imparted its know-how. Most (62 percent) of the bulk that Carter bought 
was resold to other companies. The price of bulk meprobamate that Wyeth pur-
chased from Carter was $4.98 higher than that of Carter’s per one thousand tablets 
(43 percent higher than the price Carter paid for the bulk powder). Carter increased 
its total profits through extensive royalties. Thus, Wyeth paid Carter $1.9 million 
in royalties in 1957 (a royalty of 5 percent of the selling price). “Administered 
Prices,” 86th Cong., 1960, 2nd session, part 16, at 9,185.
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quoted prices as low as $2.65 per bottle of one thousand pills to 
druggists, given that wholesalers offered a 20 percent reduction to 
druggists.90 However, despite the large difference in the price of the 
patented reserpine among brand names and unbranded versions (those 
of small firms), branded products still retained large market shares.91 
Ciba’s Serpasil, for example, was more widely prescribed than reser-
pine and was the leading brand. However, Panray sold only to insti-
tutions and hospitals; it did almost no business with druggists even 
though its pricing was much lower than Ciba’s.92
It seems clear that a lower price for a patented drug did not imply 
higher sales in the retail market, as the case of reserpine illustrates. 
When a drug group was introduced and received approval from the 
FDA, some manufacturers fought for a share of the prescription retail 
market, choosing any method that would establish their trade name 
in the minds of physicians, as discussed above. Big firms frequently 
employed this policy to maximize the value of their innovations, thus 
making it possible to achieve a high degree of market control from the 
supply side.93 However, the high costs of marketing and promoting a 
drug made it impossible for small sellers of generic-name products to 
obtain any significant share of the retail prescription market.
Lower prices offered by smaller firms did not jeopardize the licen-
sor’s monopoly in the prescription retail market. In this market, most 
prescriptions were written under branded trade names, even though 
small firms might sell drugs under generic names at prices that were 
a fraction of their larger rivals’ prices. In the 1950s, big companies 
made the majority of their revenue and profits in this submarket, 
in which almost 70 percent of total drug sales occurred. It is evident, 
however, that although there was no price competition in the retail 
market, the product rivalry from high levels of investment in R&D as 
new products were created, and as incremental advances were intro-
duced, forced the pharmaceutical firms to engage in costly marketing 
campaigns to increase sales of a particular brand.
Price Competition in the Institutional Market
Although small companies were unable to gain access to the retail 
drugstores, because they could neither advertise nor bear the finan-
cial costs of detail men—pharmaceutical sales representatives—they 
 90. “Administered Prices,” Report 448, 87th Congress, 1961, Session 18.
 91. There was no competition in prices in the retail market, so royalties were 
only relevant to obtain more profits.
 92. Testimony by Myron Pantzer, president of Panray, “Administered Prices,” 
86th Cong., 1960, 2nd Session, part 16, at 9,367–9,369 and 9,380.
 93. Steele, “Patent Restrictions”; Boldrin and Levine, Against Intellectual 
Monopoly.
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were nonetheless very active with regard to sales in the institutional 
market: the Military Medical Supply Agency (MMSA; the central pur-
chasing agent for all hospitals and dispensaries in the Armed Forces), 
hospitals, cities, and the Veterans Administration. Small companies 
were serious competitors in this price-sensitive market because of 
their lower prices. These institutions were required to purchase drugs 
under generic names at the lowest possible price from any qualified 
bidder. To be accepted by the government, each manufacturer’s prod-
uct had to meet certain specifications for the particular drug involved. 
Federal and state agencies had certain quality control procedures, such 
as inspection of possible suppliers’ plants, inspection of manufactur-
ing processes, or random sampling of each lot of drugs for analysis 
by the FDA. Thus, the government could accept bids by companies 
selling patented drugs under generic or brand names as long as they 
were of equal quality.
Institutional buyers usually purchased drugs through a bidding 
process. The government (federal or state) or a hospital could use two 
types of solicited bids: a negotiated bid and a competitive or adver-
tised bid. Negotiated bids were usually requested when there was a 
patented drug product available from only one or very few manufac-
turers. In this case, there was a chance to negotiate the final price. 
There was no public opening, and the government contacted each 
bidder in an attempt to convince that manufacturer that if it reduced 
the price, it would get a certain amount of business. In a competitive 
or advertised bid, the government asked for bids on a drug under its 
generic names. This process was normally used when quality drugs 
were available from more than one source and there was no room to 
negotiate the price. With this type of bid, there were specific dead-
lines by which the bid had to be returned to the purchaser and then 
there was a public opening, at which time any representative could 
enter the bidders’ room and listen to the bids as they were offered.
To understand whether the inclusion of field-of-use restrictions 
of patent licensing contracts eroded price competition in the insti-
tutional market—that is, by excluding competition from smaller 
companies—it is important to distinguish the three different scenar-
ios, as those noted above for the prescription retail market, which 
were dependent on the number of firms compounding finished pat-
ented drugs from bulk-powder active ingredients. First, in which 
there was only one bidder because the only producer of the drug in 
the United States was the licensee firm (the owner of the patent was 
a foreign company that did not operate in the United States), it was 
found that the bidder offered a discount to the institutional buyer as 
compared to the price offered in the retail market. This happened, 
for example, with the drug Sparine, which was produced only by 
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Wyeth in the United States. Wyeth negotiated a bid to the Veterans 
Administration (VA) at $24.51 per bottle in January 1958 and to the 
MMSA at $24.42 per bottle in April 1958, whereas retail druggists 
were paying $32.49.94 Similarly, in relation to the product Thorazine, 
SKF—the only producer of this drug in the United States—offered 
sales to the federal government at a price lower than that on the retail 
market.95 For example, during the period from 1956 to 1959, the MMSA 
bought $2,215,113 worth of Thorazine from SKF at negotiated prices. 
In 1956, they twice purchased the 25-milligram dose in bottles of 
fifty—at $2.19 and $2.21—whereas a druggist paid $3.03. In 1957, 
druggists paid $2.27 for the same type and dosage of Thorazine. In 
1957, the MMSA made one purchase in the amount of $33.46 for 
the 100-milligram tablet in bottles of five hundred. However, in that 
year, the price to retail druggists was $46.32. In 1958 the MMSA made 
two purchases of the 25-milligram dose in bottles of fifty—at $2.17 
and at $2.19. In 1958 the MMSA made one purchase in the amount 
of $33.37 for 100-milligram tablets in bottles of five hundred. At the 
same time, the price to retail druggists was $46.32. In 1959 the MMSA 
made a purchase for $20.80 for 25-milligram tablets in bottles of five 
hundred, while the price to retail druggists was $28.79.96
It seems clear from these data that in the first scenario, when there 
was only one bidder, the government paid a lower price in compar-
ison to the price paid by retail druggists. This reduction was around 
25 percent to 30 percent.97 There were two main reasons for giving 
this price discount: the first was that large institutions bought drugs 
in great quantities, and the second was that distribution expenses, 
advertising, and selling costs were not a factor in sales to federal or 
state governments.
In the second scenario, as noted above, there were only a few 
bidders and the licensing contract included a field-of-use restric-
tion. This was the case with meprobamate. The federal government 
advertised this drug by the generic name (meprobamate), but in the 
United States there were only two bidders: Carter, the patent owner, 
 94. “Administered Prices,” 86th Cong., 1960, 2nd Session, part 16, at 8,967–
8,969 and 9,276–9,277.
 95. About 70 percent of the volume of SKF’s drugs went to state and fed-
eral mental hospitals. Testimony by Walter A. Munns, president of the company, 
“Administered Prices,” 86th Cong., 1960, 2nd Session, part 16, at 8,927.
 96. Regarding the purchases of the drug for intravenous use, in 1956 the MMSA 
bought two quantities from SKF: one for $3.16 and another for $3.17: 25 milligrams. 
In 1957 the MMSA made one purchase at $3.27 and another in 1958 in the amount 
of $3.12 for the same product. During this same period, for the same product, SKF 
charged retail druggists $4.38.
 97. SKF also made sales to the VA at very similar prices to those offered to the 
MMSA.
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and Wyeth, the licensee. Carter sold in bulk form to Wyeth, which 
then tableted, bottled, and labeled it under its own trademark prior 
to distribution. The MMSA asked for competitive bids, but the out-
come was always the same: identical prices but lower than retail 
prices. Wallace (a division of Carter) and Wyeth bid exactly the same 
price, so the agency was forced to settle the matter by splitting the 
awarded contract, drawing lots, or making the decision on the basis 
of a labor surplus area (see table 4). Henry H. Hoyt, the president of 
Carter, explained the situation, saying that the firm had a standard 
price for everyone, from the wholesale druggist in the city, to county 
and state hospitals, and to military supply depots. The latter two cat-
egories received discounts because the orders were placed for large 
amounts.98 The wholesaler who bought meprobamate paid $3.25 for a 
package of fifty while the government paid $2.50. The price per tablet 
to druggists was 6.5 cents and to the MMSA was 5 cents, which was 
a discount of around 23 percent.
In conclusion, in these first two scenarios—that is, when only one 
firm or a few firms manufactured a patented drug—either the producer 
monopolized it or sellers shared the market, respectively. This hap-
pened with the patented tranquilizers meprobamate, promazine, and 
chlorpromazine, purchased by the MMSA at prices that were 25 percent 
to 35 percent lower than the price to retail druggists.
The third scenario was in which both large and small firms manu-
factured the patented drug and were able to make bids to institutional 
buyers. In other words, patent licensing contracts did not include a 
field-of-use restriction and small firms compounded finished drugs, 
converting the bulk drug into finished packaged tablets and selling 
them at their own prices. This is the case with reserpine, a drug devel-
oped by Ciba Pharmaceutical Co. but which was widely licensed, allow-
ing the licensees to sell the drug in bulk powder form. Small firms 
could set lower prices due to their lower manufacturing costs, given 
that there were no economies of scale in production and they did not 
have to undertake R&D or marketing costs in the manufacture of the 
drug. There were several suppliers that made bids at one time or another. 
Institutional buyers asked for these bids generically.99 The result was 
 98. The MMSA bought in bottles of five hundred (except in one bid) as 
opposed to sales to druggists in bottles of fifty. Testimony by Henry H. Hoyt, 
“Administered Prices,” 86th Cong., 1960, 2nd Session, part 16, at 9,185–9,186.
 99. In comparing retail druggists’ prices to those established under a bid, it 
was clear that bidders supplying a brand-name drug in a competitive bid were 
forced to cut their prices significantly more than in a negotiated bid. The reason is 
that in this bidding process, they were competing with many smaller companies, 
which forced them to reduce their prices. In cases in which a few companies man-
ufactured the product, the price to the federal government would be just one-sixth 
or one-fifth of what it was to druggists.
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a reduction from 1956 to 1959 in the price for reserpine sold to the 
MMSA from $1.39 to 60 cents, a reduction of more than 60 percent 
(see table 5). On several occasions, Ciba underbid smaller firms that sold 
only under the generic name, with the lowest price being offered by 
Ciba: 60 cents a bottle in February 1959, which was only 1.5 percent 
of Ciba’s price to retail druggists of $39.90.100
Reserpine is the only example in which there was a wide variation 
in prices in the institutional market, even though it was a patented 
drug. The reason for this unusual situation is that Ciba, which won the 
patent, licensed any company that wanted to be licensed. Ciba also 
allowed the licensees to sell the drug in bulk powder form to small 
firms that manufactured their own capsules—under their own brand 
name or more frequently under the generic name—because the licens-
ing contracts did not contain a field-of-use restriction. Thus, small 
firms broke into the manufacturing process and sold reserpine at lower 
prices than the large firms. The introduction of more bidders led to 
substantial price reductions in the institutional market.101
In is clear from these data that the lowest bids came from major 
drug companies supplying brand-name drugs in only two cases: 
in the first, brand-names were purchased when the proprietary drug 
was one from the few producers available (a negotiated bid), and the 
second was when the supplier of the proprietary drug was the lowest 
bidder.
 100. The cost of production of such a bottle was 1.6 percent of the wholesale 
price.
 101. “Administered Prices,” 86th Cong., 1960, 2nd Session, part 18, 1960, at 
10,595.
Table 4. U.S. Military Medical Supply Agency bids on negotiated contracts, 
1958–1959, meprobamate, bottles (five hundred tablets)




Unit Price Total price Other  
bidders
Jan. 13, 1958 13,680 Wyeth* 22.5 307,800 Wallace
Jan. 21, 1958 2,000 Wallace 2.5 (it was a  
tie bid, small  
business)**
5,000 Wallace
Mar. 3, 1958 19,200 Wyeth* 22.5 (tie bid) 432,000 Wallace
Apr. 11, 1958 19,200 Split 22.5 432,000 Wallace
Nov. 17, 1958 6,000 Wyeth 20.25 121,500 Wallace
Feb. 5, 1959 43,560 Wallace (won  
by draw)
20.25 882,090 Wallace
Apr. 6, 1959 22,128 Wyeth 20.25 448,092 Wallace
Sept. 2, 1959 18,768 Wyeth* 19.845 372,281 Wallace
Source: “Administered Prices,” 86th Cong., 1960, 2nd session, part 16, at 9,200.
Note: * = awarded the bid because they were in a labor surplus area. ** = in bottles of fifty.
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Table 5. Military Medical Supply Agency orders of reserpine, 25 mg., bottles of 1,000




Unit price  
(dollars)
Total price  
(dollars)
Other bidders Price(s)/cents per tablet
Feb. 20, 1956 Advertised 685 Eli Lilly 1.39 3,948 E. R. Squibb 6.1
Feb. 20, 1956 Advertised 2,160 Eli Lilly 1.39 Smith-Dorsey 2.57
Feb. 20, 1956 Advertised 672 Eli Lilly 1.39 Ciba Pharmaceutical 2.04
Pitman-Moore Co. 3.25
Oct. 3, 1956 Negotiated 1,080 Ciba 1.15 2,469 Lilly 2.35
Oct. 3, 1956 Negotiated 1,224 Ciba 1.15 2,469
Nov. 29, 1956 Advertised 2,808 Panray Corp. 1.10 3,088 American Pharma Co. 1.29/1.26/1.27
Kasar Co. 2
Eli Lilly 1.16
Merck Sharpe & Dohme 1.38
E. R. Squibb 2.35
Feb. 11, 1957 Negotiated 2,472 Ciba 0,92 3,797 American Pharma Co. 1.04
1,656 Ciba 0,92 3,797 American Pharma Co. 1.08
Eli Lilly 1.22
Panray Corp. 1.1




Jan. 30, 1958 Negotiated 6,912 Panray Corp. 0.7 4,838 Bryant 1.6
Ciba 0.76
Eli Lilly 0.773
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Unit price  
(dollars)
Total price  
(dollars)
Other bidders Price(s)/cents per tablet
Jun. 20, 1958 Advertised 4,200 American  
Quinine Co
0.65 2,772 American Pharma Co. 0.84








E. R. Squibb 2.35
Success Chemical 0.9
Sep. 1958 Advertised 3,432 Ciba 0.64 2,196 American Pharma Co. 0.89







E. R. Squibb 1.72
Strong Cobb 1.21
Feb. 24, 1959 Advertised 3,960 Ciba 0.6 2,376 American Pharma Co. 0.82
American Quinine 0.65/0.63/0.68/0.64/0.67/0.66
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Conclusions
By the late 1950s, Congressional Democrats, the FTC, consumer 
groups, and some physicians had become preoccupied with the high 
costs of drugs and the advertising practices of prescription drug firms. 
In response to these concerns, Senator Kefauver started a Congressio-
nal investigation to study the price inflexibility of those firms produc-
ing ethical drugs. On May 8, 1961, the Subcommittee on Antitrust and 
Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Committee submitted its report on 
the ethical drugs industry. The report found that monopolistic drug 
pricing and abuses of patent privilege existed in the U.S. pharmaceuti-
cal industry. Kefauver unsuccessfully tried to restrict the use of phar-
maceutical patents so as to increase competition and thereby reduce 
the price of prescription drugs.
In this article, we examined whether patents were employed as a 
strategy to restrict price competition. We studied the tranquilizer sector 
in the period when psychopharmacology in the treatment of mental 
illness really took off. At that time, pharmaceutical firms holding a 
patent usually decided to include a restrictive clause—a field-of-use 
restriction—in patent licensing contracts, which allowed licensees to 
sell only in finished form. In this way, the patent owner prevented small 
firms from buying bulk sales of the finished powder in order to tablet the 
powder and sell it, either generically or under their own brand names 
at lower prices. Smaller firms were able to sell drugs at lower prices 
because they did not have to recoup extensive R&D and marketing costs 
and, therefore, they incurred fewer costs than the big firms.
We found that field-of-use restrictions were used as solutions to 
exclude price competition from small companies only in the institu-
tional market, in which price competition was extremely important 
to win a bid. On the one hand, licensing contracts that did not contain 
field-of-use restrictions allowed the presence of smaller bidders, and 
so the big companies were forced to enter into price competition and 
to reduce their prices if they wanted to win a bid.102 On the other 
hand, small sellers could not obtain any significant share of the insti-
tutional market if the relevant patent licensing contract included a 
field-of-use restriction.
By contrast, in the retail segment, those companies that sold pat-
ented brand-name tranquilizers were able to maintain their market 
 102. There are three main reasons why big companies offered low bids to the 
government: to gain prestige in having their material used by these institutions, to 
promote a brand to the doctors who worked at these institutions (and who, when 
they went out and practiced in civilian life, would remember the brand), and to 
clear excess stock.
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price against a lower-priced drug sold under its generic name. In this 
submarket, there was no price competition, even when smaller firms 
were present as competitors. As a consequence, the strategy of includ-
ing field-of-use restrictions in licensing contracts made no sense in the 
retail prescription submarket, because the presence of smaller firms 
selling the same drug at lower prices did not threaten the licensor’s 
monopoly. High advertising and promotional costs prevented price 
competition from smaller firms in relation to ethical drugs, regardless 
of the inclusion of field-of-use restrictions in licensing contracts.
Although there was no price competition from small firms selling 
patented drugs under their generic names in the retail market, com-
petition among patented drugs was a significant issue, because these 
drugs were often highly substitutable and could compete with one 
another. In this situation, the big pharmaceutical firms attempted to 
sell their products in the retail market, not by offering lower prices 
but by investing large sums in advertising, promotion, and marketing. 
The high volume of advertising arose from fierce competition among 
new products due to high rates of product obsolescence and rapidly 
growing markets. These conditions promoted competition and pro-
vided an impetus to innovate. The final aim of promotional activities 
was to differentiate products from those of competitors and to attract 
the attention of physicians. This product competition provided a soci-
etal benefit: it increased the rate at which firms developed new drugs 
and accelerated the introduction of improved (though not innovative) 
drugs, thus providing patients with a greater range of choices.103
Finally, we argued that it is not possible to show that monopolies 
arose from patent privilege, because product competition undoubt-
edly existed. High prices for patented drugs allowed the financing 
of sales campaigns due to product rivalry, although with little or no 
price difference involved. Patented products were often highly sub-
stitutable and could thus compete with one another; additionally, 
patents did not ensure a monopoly position without a significant 
selling effort. Therefore, advertising was complementary to inno-
vation: competition between identical chemical entities substantially 
increased the effectiveness of sales efforts in this industry. Thus, 
we found a positive and increasing feedback between innovation and 
advertising that was essential to this industry and was particularly 
significant in the case of tranquilizers. Pharmaceutical firms used 
patents and complementary heavy investment in promotion and mar-
keting as a strategy for increasing their market share and to combat 
competition from ethical drugs that were chemically different yet 
offered comparable therapies.
 103. Lee, ““Me-too’ Products.”
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2016.43
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 92.185.99.100, on 08 Jun 2017 at 16:09:21, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
317Ethical Pharmaceutical Industry
Bibliography of Works Cited
Books
Boldrin, Michele, and David K. Levine. Against Intellectual Monopoly. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Carpenter, Daniel. Reputation and Power: Organizational Image and Pharma-
ceutical Regulation at the FDA. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2010.
Chandler, Alfred D. Shaping the Industrial Century: The Remarkable Story 
of the Evolution of the Modern Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industries. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005.
Contractor, Farok J. Licensing in International Strategy. Westport, CT: Quorum 
Books, 1985.
Gambardella, Alfonso. Science and Innovation: The US Pharmaceutical 
Industry During the 1980s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Gaudillière, Jean Paul, and Ulrike Thoms. The Development of Scientific Mar-
keting in the Twentieth Century: Research for Sales in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry. London: Routledge, 2015.
Greene, Jeremy A. Generic: The Unbranding of Modern Medicine. Baltimore, 
MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014.
———. Prescribing by Numbers: Drugs and the Definitions of Disease. 
Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 2007.
Greene, Jeremy A., and E. Siegel Watkins, eds. Prescribed: Writing, Filling, 
Using, and Abusing the Prescription in Modern America. Baltimore, MD: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012.
Harris, Richard. The Real Voice. New York: Macmillan, 1964.
Healy, David. The Antidepressant Era. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1997.
———. The Creation of Psychopharmacology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 2002.
———. Let Them Eat Prozac: The Unhealthy Relationship Between the Phar-
maceutical Industry and Depression. New York: New York University 
Press, 2004.
Herzberg, David. Happy Pills in America: From Miltown to Prozac. Baltimore, 
MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009.
Liebenau, Jonathan. Medical Science and Medical Industry: The Formation of 
the American Pharmaceutical Industry. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1987.
Mahoney, Tom. The Merchants of Life. New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1959.
Marks, Harry M. Progress of Experiment: Science and Therapeutic Reform 
in the United States, 1900–1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997.
Metzl, Jonathan. Prozac on the Couch: Prescribing Gender in the Era of 
Wonder Drugs. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003.
Mintz, Morton. The Therapeutic Nightmare. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 
1965.
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2016.43
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 92.185.99.100, on 08 Jun 2017 at 16:09:21, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
318 CEBRIÁN AND LÓPEZ
Rasmussen, Nicolas. On Speed: The Many Lives of Amphetamine. New York: 
New York University Press, 2008.
Schwartzman, David. Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry. Baltimore, 
MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.
Shorter, Edward. A History of Psychiatry: From the Era of the Asylum to the 
Age of Prozac. Oxford: John Wiley & Sons, 1997.
Silberston, Zangwill Aubrey. The Economic Importance of Patents. London: 
Common Law Institute of Intellectual Property, 1987.
Silverman, Milton. The Drugging of the Americas. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1976.
Silverman, Milton, and Philip R. Lee. Pills, Profits & Politics. Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1974.
Smith, Mickey C. A Social History of the Minor Tranquilizers: The Quest for 
Small Comfort in the Age of Anxiety. Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Pub-
lishing Group, 1991.
Swazey, Judith. Chlorpromazine in Psychiatry: A Study of Therapeutic Inno-
vation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1974.
Taylor, Christopher T., and Z. Aubrey Silberston. The Economic Impact of the 
Patent System. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.
Temin, Peter. Taking Your Medicine: Drug Regulation in the United States. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980.
Tobbell, Dominique. Pills, Power, and Policy: The Struggle for Drug Reform in 
Cold War America and Its Consequences. Berkeley: University of California 
Press/Milbank Books on Health and the Public, 2012.
Tone, Andrea. The Age of Anxiety: A History of America’s Turbulent Affair 
with Tranquilizers. New York: Basic Books, 2009.
Williamson, James R. Federal Antitrust Policy during the Kennedy–Johnson 
Years. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1995.
Articles and Chapters in Books
Achilladelis, Basil, and Nicholas Antonakis. “The Dynamics of Technological 
Innovation: The Case of the Pharmaceutical Industry.” Research Policy 30 
(2001): 535–588.
Arora, Ashish. “Patents, Licensing, and Market Structure in the Chemical 
Industry.” Research Policy 26, no. 4 (1997): 391–403.
Arrow, Kenneth J. “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for 
Invention.” In The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and 
Social Factors, edited by Universities-National Bureau Committee for Eco-
nomic Research, Committee on Economic Growth of the Social Science 
Research Council, 609–626. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962.
Bachrach, Leona L. “The State of the State Mental Hospital at the Turn of the 
Century.” New Directions for Mental Health Services 91 (2001): 89–106.
Ban Thomas, A. “Fifty Years Chlorpromazine: A Historical Perspective.” 
Neuropsychiatric Disease & Treatment 3, no. 4 (2007): 495–500.
Bud, Robert. “Antibiotics, Big Business, and Consumers: The Context of 
Government Investigations Into the Postwar American Drug Industry.” 
Technology and Culture 46, no. 2 (2005): 329–349.
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2016.43
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 92.185.99.100, on 08 Jun 2017 at 16:09:21, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
319Ethical Pharmaceutical Industry
Clarkson, Kenneth W. “The Use of Pharmaceutical Profitability Measures for 
Public Policy Actions.” In Issues in Pharmaceutical Economics, edited by 
Robert L. Chien, 105–124. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1979.
Comanor, William S. “Research and Competitive Product Differentiation in 
the Pharmaceutical Industry in the United States.” Economica 31, no. 124 
(1964): 372–384.
———. “The Political Economy of the Pharmaceutical Industry.” Journal of 
Economic Literature 24 (September 1986): 1178–1217.
David, Paul, Dominique Foray, and W. Edward Steinmueller. “The Research 
Network and the New Economics of Science: From Metaphor to Orga-
nizational Behaviours.” In The Organization of Economic Innovation 
in Europe, edited by A. Gambardella and F. Malerba, 303–342. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Donohue, Julie. “History of Drug Advertising: The Evolving Roles of Con-
sumers and Consumer Protection.” Milbank Quarterly 84, no. 4 (2006): 
659–699.
Ellison, Glenn, and Sara F. Ellison. “Strategic Entry Deterrence and the Behav-
ior of Pharmaceutical Incumbents Prior to Patent Expiration.” American 
Economic Journal: Microeconomics 3, no. 1 (2011): 1–36.
Faunce, T., and J. Lexchin. “‘Linkage’ Pharmaceutical Evergreening in Canada 
and Australia.” Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 4, no. 8 (2007): 
1–11.
Gallini, Nancy. “Deterrence by Market Sharing: A Strategic Incentive for 
Licensing.” American Economic Review 74 (1984): 931–941.
———. “The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent US Patent Reform.” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 16, no. 2 (2002): 131–154.
Gaudillière, Jean Paul. “From Propaganda to Scientific Marketing: Schering, 
Cortisone, and the Construction of Drug Markets.” History and Technology 
29, no. 2 (2013): 188–209.
———. “Marketing Loops: Clinical Research, Consumption of Antidepressants 
and the Reorganization of Promotion at Geigy in the 1960s and 1970s.” In 
The Development of Scientific Marketing in the Twentieth Century: Research 
for Sales in the Pharmaceutical Industry, edited by Jean Paul Gaudillière 
and Ulrike Thoms, 167–190. London: Routledge, 2015.
Grabowski, Henry G., and John M. Vernon. “Substitution Laws and Innova-
tion in the Pharmaceutical Industry.” Law Contemporary Problems 43, no. 1 
(Winter–Spring 1979): 43–66.
Greene, Jeremy A. “Attention to ‘Details’: Etiquette and the Pharmaceutical 
Salesman in Postwar American.” Social Studies of Science 34, no. 2 (2004): 
271–292.
Greene, Jeremy A., and Scott H. Podolsky. “Keeping Modern in Medicine: 
Pharmaceutical Promotion and Physician Education in Postwar America.” 
Bulletin of the History of Medicine 83, no. 2 (2009): 331–377.
———. “Reform, Regulation, and Pharmaceuticals—The Kefauver-Harris 
Amendments at 50.” New England Journal of Medicine 367 (2012): 1481–1483.
Gronfein, William. “Psychotropic Drugs and the Origins of Deinstitutionaliza-
tion.” Social Problems 32, no. 5 (1985): 437–454.
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2016.43
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 92.185.99.100, on 08 Jun 2017 at 16:09:21, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
320 CEBRIÁN AND LÓPEZ
Harcourt, Bernard E. “Reducing Mass Incarceration: Lessons from the Dein-
stitutionalization of Mental Hospitals in the 1960s.” Ohio State Journal of 
Criminal Law 53 (2011): 53–88.
Henderson, R., L. Orsenigo, and G. P. Pisano. “The Pharmaceutical Industry and 
the Revolution in Molecular Biology: Exploring the Interaction between 
Scientific, Institutional and Organizational Change.” In The Sources of 
Industrial Leadership, edited by D. Mowery and R. R. Nelson, 267–311. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Herzberg, David. “Busted for Blockbusters. ‘Scrip Mills?’ Quaalude, and Pre-
scribing Power in the 1970s.” In Prescribed: Writing, Filling, Using, and 
Abusing the Prescription in Modern America, edited by Jeremy A. Greene 
and E. Siegel, 207–231. Watkins. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press, 2012.
Ignaciuk, Agata, Teresa Ortiz-Gómez, and Esteban Rodriguez-Ocaña. “Doctors, 
Women and the Circulation of Knowledge of Oral Contraceptives in Spain, 
1960s–1970s.” In Gendered Drugs and Medicine: Historical and Socio- 
Cultural Perspectives, edited by Teresa Ortiz-Gómez and María Jesús 
Santesmases, 133–152. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2014.
Katz, Michael L., and Carl Shapiro. “How to License Intangible Property.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 101 (1986): 567–589.
Kendall, K. W., Simon Ng, and Bertram Schoner. “Consumer Responses to 
Generic/Chemically Equivalent Drugs.” Journal of Public Policy and 
Marketing 10, no. 2 (1991): 182–201.
Kessel, Nils. “Beyond Innovation: Pharmaceutical Marketing, Market Struc-
ture and the Importance of the Old in West Germany, 1950–70.” In The 
Development of Scientific Marketing in the Twentieth Century: Research 
for Sales in the Pharmaceutical Industry, edited by Jean Paul Gaudillière 
and Ulrike Thoms, 15–28. London: Routledge, 2015.
———. “‘Doriden von Ciba’: Sleeping Pills, Pharmaceutical Marketing, and 
Thalidomide, 1955–1963.” History and Technology 29, no. 2 (2013): 191–205.
Kremer, Michael. “Patent Buyouts: Mechanisms for Encouraging Innovation.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, no. 4 (1998): 1137–1167.
Lall, Sanjaya. “International Pharmaceutical Industry and Less-Developed 
Countries: I: Oligopolistic Power of Leading Firms.” Economic and Politi-
cal Weekly 9, no. 47 (1974): 1947–1958.
———. “Price Competition and the International Pharmaceutical Industry.” 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 40 (1978): 9–21.
Lanjouw, Jean O., and Mark Schankerman. “Protecting Intellectual Property 
Rights: Are Small Firms Handicapped?” Journal of Law and Economics 47 
(2004): 45–74.
Laties, Victor G., and Bernard Weiss. “A Critical Review of the Efficacy of 
Meprobamate (Miltown, Equanil) in the Treatment of Anxiety.” Journal of 
Chronic Diseases 7, no. 6 (1978): 500–519.
Lee, Thomas H. “Me-too Products: Friend or Foe?” New England Journal of 
Medicine 350 (2004): 211–212.
Leffler, Keith B. “Persuasion or Information? The Economics of Prescription 
Drug Advertising.” Journal of Law and Economics 24 (1981): 45–74.
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2016.43
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 92.185.99.100, on 08 Jun 2017 at 16:09:21, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
321Ethical Pharmaceutical Industry
Levin, Richard C., Alvin K. Klevorick, Richard R. Nelson, and Sidney G. 
Winter. “Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Develop-
ment.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 3 (1987): 783–832.
Liebenau, Jonathan. “Patents and the Chemical Industry: Tools of Business 
Strategy.” In The Challenge of New Technology: Innovation in British Busi-
ness Since 1850, edited by Jonathan Liebenau, 133–150. Aldershot, UK: 
Gower, 1988.
López-Muñoz, Francisco, Cecilio Alamo, Eduardo Shen Cuenca, Patrick 
Winston W. Clervoy, and Gabriel Rubio. “History of the Discovery and 
Clinical Introduction of Chlorpromazine.” Annals of Clinical Psychiatry 
17, no. 3 (2005): 113–135.
Mansfield, Edwin. “Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study.” Manage-
ment Science 32, no. 2 (1986): 173–181.
Marks, Harry M. “Making Risks Visible: The Science, Politics and Regulation of 
Adverse Drug Reactions.” In Ways of Regulating: Therapeutic Agents Between 
Plants, Shops and Consulting Rooms, edited by Jean Paul Gaudillière and 
Volker Hess, 105–122. Berlin, Germany: Max-Planck Institute, 2009.
Mechanic, David, and David A. Rochefort. “Deinstitutionalization: An 
Appraisal of Reform.” Annual Review of Sociology 16 (1990): 301–327.
Meurer, Michael J. “The Settlement of Patent Litigation.” RAND Journal of 
Economics 20, no. 1 (1989): 77–91.
Munos, Bernard. “Lessons from 60 years of Pharmaceutical Innovation.” 
Nature Reviews Drug Discovery 8 (2009): 959–968.
Penin, Julien. “Patents Versus Ex Post Rewards: A New Look.” Research 
Policy 34 (2005): 641–156.
Polanyi, Michael. “Patent Reform.” Review of Economic Review 11 (1944): 
61–76.
Quirke, Viviane. “The Material Culture of British Pharmaceutical Laborato-
ries in the Golden Age of Drug Discovery (c. 1935–75).” International Jour-
nal for the History of Engineering & Technology 79, no. 2 (2009): 280–299.
———. “From Alkaloids to Gene Therapy: A Brief History of Drug Discovery 
in the 20th Century.” In Making Medicines: A Brief History of Pharmacy and 
Pharmaceuticals, edited by Stuart Anderson, 177–201. London: Pharmaceu-
tical Press, 2005.
Rasmussen, Nicolas. “Making the First Anti-Depressant: Amphetamine in 
American Medicine, 1929–1950.” Journal of the History of Medicine and 
Allied Sciences 61, no. 3 (2006): 288–323.
Rockett, Katharine E. “Choosing the Competition and Patent Licensing.” 
RAND Journal of Economics 21, no. 1 (1990): 161–171.
Sarett, Lewis H. “FDA Regulations and Their Influence on Future R and D.” 
Research Management 27 (March 1974): 18–20.
Scroop, Daniel. “A Faded Passion? Estes Kefauver and the Senate Subcommit-
tee on Antitrust and Monopoly.” Business and Economic History On-Line 
5 (2007): 1–17.
Slinn, Judy. “The Development of the Pharmaceutical Industry.” In Making 
Medicines: A Brief History of Pharmacy and Pharmaceuticals, edited by 
Stuart Anderson, 155–176. London: Pharmaceutical Press, 2005.
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2016.43
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 92.185.99.100, on 08 Jun 2017 at 16:09:21, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
322 CEBRIÁN AND LÓPEZ
———. “Price Controls or Control Through Prices? Regulating the Cost and 
Consumption of Prescription Pharmaceuticals in the UK, 1948–67.” Busi-
ness History 47, no. 3 (2005): 352–366.
———. “Patents and the UK Pharmaceutical Industry Between 1945 and the 
1970s.” History and Technology 24, no. 2 (2008): 191–205.
Statman, Meir. “The Effect of Patent Expiration on the Market Position of 
Drugs.” In Drugs and Health: Issues and Policy Objectives, edited by 
Robert B. Helms, 140–151. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 
1981.
Statman, Meir, and Tyzoon Tyebjee. “Strategic Responses to Changes in Pub-
lic Policy: The Case of the Pharmaceutical Industry and Drug Substitution 
Laws.” Journal of Public Policy and Marketing 3, no. 1 (1984): 99–112.
———. “Trademarks, Patents, and Innovation in the Ethical Drug Industry.” 
Journal of Marketing 45, no. 3 (1981): 71–81.
Steele, Henry. “The Fortunes of Economic Reform Legislation: The Case of 
the Drug Amendments Act of 1962.” American Journal of Economics and 
Sociology 25, no. 1 (January 1966): 39–51.
———. “Monopoly and Competition in the Ethical Drugs Market.” Journal of 
Law and Economics 5, no. 1 (1962): 131–163.
———. “Patent Restrictions and Price Competition in the Ethical Drugs.” Journal 
of Industrial Economics 12, no. 3 (1964): 198–223.
Stiglitz, Joseph E. “Give Prizes not Patents.” New Scientist 21 (September 16, 
2006): 21.
Swann, John P. “FDA and the Practice of Pharmacy: Prescription Drug Regu-
lation before the Durham–Humphrey Amendment of 1951.” Pharmacy in 
History 36, no. 2 (1994): 55–70.
Temin, Peter. “The Origin of Compulsory Drug Prescription.” Journal of Law 
and Economics 22, no. 1 (1979a): 91–105.
———. “Technology, Regulation, and Market Structure in the Modern Phar-
maceutical Industry.” Bell Journal of Economics 10, no. 2 (1979): 427–446.
Thoms, Ulrike. “The Contraceptive Pill, the Pharmaceutical Industry and 
Changes in the Patient–Doctor Relationship in West Germany.” In Gendered 
Drugs and Medicine: Historical and Socio-Cultural Perspectives, edited by 
Teresa Ortiz-Gómez and María Jesús Santesmases, 153–176. Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2014.
———. “Standardizing Selling: Pharmaceutical Marketing, the Pharmaceutical 
Company and the Marketing Expert (1900–1980).” History and Technology 
29, no. 2 (2013): 169–187.
Tobbell, Dominique. “Allied Against Reform: Pharmaceutical Industry–
Academic Physician Relations in the United States, 1945–1970.” Bulletin 
of the History of Medicine 82, no. 4 (2008): 878–912.
———. “Pharmaceutical Politics and Regulatory Reform in Postwar America.” In 
What’s Good for Business, edited by Kim Phillips Fein and Julian E. Zelizer, 
123–139. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
———. “‘Who’s Winning the Human Race?’ Cold War as Pharmaceutical 
Political Strategy.” Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 
64, no. 4 (2009): 429–473.
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2016.43
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 92.185.99.100, on 08 Jun 2017 at 16:09:21, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
323Ethical Pharmaceutical Industry
Tone, Andrea. “Making of Miltown.” In The Age of Anxiety: A History of 
America’s Turbulent Affair with Tranquilizers, edited by Andrea Tone, 27–
52. New York: Basic Books, 2009.
———. “Tranquilizers on Trial: Psychopharmacology in the Age of Anxiety.” 
In Medicating Modern America: Prescription Drugs in History, edited by 
Andrea Tone and Elizabeth Siegel Watkins, 156–180. New York: New York 
University Press, 2007.
Wright, Brian D. “The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and 
Research Contracts.” American Economic Review 73 (1983): 691–707.
Reports and Dissertations
Bond, Ronald S., and F. David. Lean Economic Report on Sales, Promotion, and 
Product Differentiation in Two Prescription Drug Markets. Staff Report to the 
Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics, 1977. https://www.ftc.
gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/sales-promotion-and-product- 
differentiation-two-prescription-drug-markets/197702salespromo.pdf.
McFadyen, Richard E. “Estes Kefauver and the Drug Industry.” Ph.D. diss., 
Emory University, 1973.
Moon, Nathan William. “The Amphetamine Years: A Study of the Medical 
Applications and Extramedical Consumption of Psychostimulant Drugs in 
the Postwar United States, 1945–1980.” Ph.D. diss., Georgia Institute of 
Technology, 2009.
Government Publications
United States Senate. “Administered Prices in the Drug Industry.” Hearings 
before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, DC, 1960.
———. “Administered Prices in the Drug Industry.” Report 448. Hearings 
before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Senate on the Judi-
ciary, 87th Congress, 1st session, Washington, DC, 1961.
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2016.43
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 92.185.99.100, on 08 Jun 2017 at 16:09:21, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
